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Introduction: 
 In the Fall of 2012, the Supreme Court re-opened national discussion on 
affirmative action by accepting Fisher v. University of Texas, a case in which the 
petitioners ask the Court to rule on the constitutionality of race-based preferences used at 
the University of Texas. The case is the first major examination of affirmative action 
policy since the Michigan cases in 2003. Throughout the previous decade, the public’s 
opinion of both the constitutional and political aspects of affirmative action has shifted. 
The general public, while recognizing that inequality still exists in our education system, 
has become skeptical of affirmative action in its current form. The public’s modern 
conception has arguably been shaped by the previous generation of the Court, who were 
unsympathetic to aggressive affirmative action policies. However with several new 
members on the Court, as well as an evolution of research surrounding the modern effects 
of affirmative action policy, the Court is primed to revisit the issue.  
I began this thesis with the intention of defending affirmative action in its current 
form from a philosophical and constitutional perspective. However, throughout my 
analysis I was swayed by compelling data-driven evidence that I believe undermine the 
efficacy of modern affirmative action policy, bringing with it strong moral and 
constitutional considerations. Over the last several decades, the debate surrounding 
affirmative action’s legitimacy has largely presupposed the importance of the policy in 
the pursuit of underrepresented minority’s upward social and economic mobility. But 
what if that underlying assumption was patently untrue? Recently, a theory was 
developed outlining how, in its actual effect, affirmative action may actually be hurting 
those it is supposed to help. This theory is called the mismatch hypothesis, and it 
C h a s a n 	  |	  2	  	  
stipulates that “affirmative action in admissions leads to underrepresented minorities 
being admitted to colleges with entering credentials that are significantly lower than their 
non-minority counterparts resulting in the minority students not being competitive.”1 This 
paper carefully examines the mismatch hypothesis, as well as the constitutional question 
of what it would mean to change affirmative action policy. 
 Chapter 1 serves as a lengthy primer on affirmative action policy, detailing the 
complicated social and political history of affirmative action throughout the last 70 years 
and bringing the debate to the modern day. In order to fully understand affirmative action 
today, it is imperative to understand how it has effectively changed throughout 
Presidents, eras of the Supreme Court, and in the eyes of the public so that any policy 
change does not have to start from scratch or apply already-failed tactics as a remedy. 
This understanding will also serve to inform the sort of changes to the policy that will 
pass constitutional scrutiny to ensure the perpetuity of the system as long as it is 
necessary. Chapter 2 delves into the political philosophy of affirmative action, looking at 
works from the Federalist Papers to modern scholars of constitutional and political 
theory, advocating the necessity of affirmative action policy (at least in some form) if we 
are to stay true to our civil values as Americans. This interpretation also deals with core 
constitutional arguments, as constitutional interpretation of the 14th Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause – the part most often cited in lawsuits against affirmative action’s 
implementation – often rest on top of American political theory, and an analysis of that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Peter	  Arcidiacono,	  et	  al.	  “Affirmative	  Action	  And	  University	  Fit:	  Evidence	  From	  Proposition	  209.”	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research.	  Working	  Paper.	  Cambridge,	  Massachusetts.	  November	  2012.	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same theory can illuminate the ‘correct’ theories to apply, or at least inform our 
understanding of them. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 cut to the heart of the constitutional challenge to affirmative 
action policy. I take the stance that while affirmative action is not only constitutional but 
should be allowed to function more broadly than the Court allows, the reality of the 
present day situation is that the changes to the policy over the last twenty-odd years have 
put it on an unsustainable path, both in its effect and in its constitutional survival under 
the scrutinizing eyes of the Supreme Court. Therefore, Chapter 3 ends with arguing for 
the necessity of change from a purely race-based system to a class-based system with a 
focus on race when possible. Chapter 4 continues this class-based line of reasoning, 
arguing its constitutional merits and outlining how a class-based system of affirmative 
action policy would pass legal muster where a race-based system would not. I also take 
the stance that despite the ideological qualms that accompany such a claim, it is vital to 
reinvigorate the effectiveness that affirmative action policy saw in its early days. I would 
rather see goals of the program achieved through sustainable means than unsustainable – 
yet noble – means that scuttle effective change. 
 Chapter 5 deals with the core argument of the mismatch hypothesis, weighing the 
arguments for and against the theory, and finally advocating in favor of the hypothesis, 
addressing the claims against it one by one. Chapter 5 is data-driven, with the Part I 
creating a narrative through piecemeal juxtapositions of a plethora of studies on 
affirmative action in education from World Bank studies in Kenya to top-tier American 
law-school analysis. Part II looks at California’s Proposition 209 as a comprehensive case 
study in affirmative action policy’s effectiveness when race-based preferences are 
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dropped in lieu of more class-based ones, as the modern policy essentially centers on 
higher education. In this part especially, the case for a class-based system is given 
significant empirical backing. Finally, the conclusion ties together Chapters 1-5 and lays 
out this paper’s overall claim. 
 In my analysis of affirmative action policy, I began the search without having 
formed any opinion whatsoever. The topic was interesting to me, and after reading a mass 
of news editorials and their op-eds, I decided to take up the argument for myself. Other 
than the fact that I am a student, I have no stake in affirmative action policy. This paper 
relies primarily on the foremost half-dozen or so notable mismatch theory scholars, a 
close reading of an innumerable number of Supreme Court opinions, affirmative action-
related studies from higher education academics and policy institutes, and how historical 
executive actions in particular have shaped the past, present, and now the future of 
affirmative action policy. So, it is with the past that we begin. 
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Chapter 1: A Historical Primer on Affirmative Action 
 
Part I: The Creation & Peak of Affirmative Action 
 
 In 1935, New York Senator Robert Wagner sponsored the National Labor 
Relations Act. It was a landmark piece of legislation that allowed workers to organize 
unions, collectively bargain, and prevent ‘unfair labor practices.’ The Wagner Act, as it 
came to be called, also gave upper management the ability to take “affirmative action” to 
promote victims of discrimination to a level that they estimated the workers would reach 
had that discrimination not hindered their advancement.2 Six years later, on June 18th, 
1941 Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802 at the behest Black community leaders who 
threatened to march on Washington with over a hundred thousand Black followers, 
causing inevitable clashes on the steps of the White House and Capitol building.3 
Roosevelt’s executive order declared that there would henceforth be “no discrimination 
in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, 
color, or national origin,” adding that it was the primary duty of government to provide 
for “the full and equitable participation of all workers” in its society.4 The executive 
order was eventually expanded two years later using Presidential wartime powers to 
eliminate discrimination in a broad array of war industries (including union membership) 
while simultaneously authorizing the formation of the Fair Employment Practices 
Committee (FEPC) to enforce these provisions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Act.	  Senator	  Robert	  Wagner.	  29	  U.S.C.	  §§	  151-­‐169.	  1935.	  
3	  Terry	  H.	  Anderson.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Fairness:	  A	  History	  of	  Affirmative	  Action.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  2004.	  
4	  Exec.	  Order	  No.	  8802,	  3	  C.F.R.	  1941.	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 Only a short time after the term ‘affirmative action’ was coined, the conversation 
surrounding its use became the center of national attention, and it would not be the only 
time. The Crisis magazine, an NAACP-affiliated publication, asked the practical question 
of “whether there is a great deal of difference between the code for Negroes under Hitler 
and the code for Negroes under the United States of America?” The point was well taken, 
and was not restricted to the Black community. The Nation magazine saw the hypocrisy 
as well, editorializing that “Americans infected with the spirit of fascism have attacked 
our fighting forces in the rear. We cannot fight fascism abroad while turning a blind eye 
to fascism at home,” speaking to the disparaging treatment of Black Americans during 
WWII.5 The time was ripe for civil rights leaders to aggressively push these policies from 
the national discussion into codified law. The United States was lending incredible 
financial and personnel aid to the Allied powers during WWII for (at least to many) 
largely moral reasons against an openly bigoted and racist Axis, and it would be too 
ironic and hypocritical if the same issues were not addressed domestically. 
 Though they were implemented with varying levels of effectiveness, codified 
changes to race relations came from all branches of government. In the Court, an 8-1 
majority ruled in Smith v. Allwright that all-white primaries were unconstitutional, even 
though a private body held the primary. Writing for the majority, Justice Stanley Reed 
stated that a political party could not be fully private, as it was an agent to elect state 
officials and therefore the system in place in Texas (and in all other similarly situated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Anderson,	  Terry	  H.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Fairness.	  p.	  26.	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states) violated the 15th amendment.6 In the Senate, New Mexico Senator Chavez 
introduced and passed a bill that took the wartime-only Fair Employment Practices 
Commission (FEPC) and made it permanent. Historian Robert Bailey said that this bill 
became a 
“symbol for the two philosophies of government and life. Chavez represented liberals 
who felt the federal government could, and should, legislate to end inequality and correct 
social injustice. Bilbo represented conservatives who felt that Jim Crow was a fact of life 
and that the federal government should not legislate against local traditions.”7 
 
The ideological clash we have come to appreciate as a common one today was even more 
vitriolic and partisan than any of our modern disputes, as Chavez and his liberal base had 
to pit this message against southern Senators, led by Mississippi Senator Bilbo, who 
derided the FEPC for attempting to “break down the color line to aid the day of 
miscegenation and mongrelization between the races,” and accused his colleagues of 
“sacrificing their white blood and white race.”8  
 Despite its vigilance, the opposition voices to the FEPC and other established 
equalization bodies were drowned out by the war experience of Black soldiers and white 
America’s experience with them and the war itself. With Hitler defeated, the idea of 
racial superiority was extraordinarily stunted, with the empathy of Americans who saw 
publicized photography of emaciated Jews and other concentration camp prisoners 
abroad now turned against Jim Crow laws at home. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Smith	  v.	  Allwright.	  321	  U.S.	  649	  (1944).	  Iconically,	  the	  case	  was	  argued	  by	  Thurdgood	  Marshall,	  who	  a	  little	  over	  a	  decade	  later	  would	  become	  the	  Court’s	  first	  Black	  justice.	  
7	  Robert	  Bailey.	  “Theodore	  G.	  Bilbo	  and	  the	  Fair	  Employment	  Practices	  Controversy:	  A	  Southern	  Senator’s	  Reaction	  to	  a	  Changing	  World.”	  Journal	  of	  Mississippi	  History.	  P.	  42	  (February	  1980).	  
8	  Anderson,	  Terry	  H.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Fairness.	  p.	  36.	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 The Truman administration took affirmative action to the next level. Soon after he 
was elected, President Truman became the first of his office to address the NAACP, 
saying in front of the Lincoln Memorial that America had changed, and now had to 
“guarantee freedom and equality to all our citizens…each man must be guaranteed 
equality of opportunity.”9 Holding true to his work, on July 26th, 1948, President Truman 
expanded Roosevelt’s executive actions to pertain to all parts of the federal government, 
further directing the military to pursue the “equality of treatment and opportunity without 
regard to race, color, religion, or national origin” as well, and established the President’s 
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed services (commonly 
called the Fahy Committee) to ensure that it was done.10 
 World War II served the spark that Black groups needed to achieve significant 
steps in achieving equal opportunity that had seemed impossible only a few decades 
earlier. In Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Brown’s majority opinion had a piece in it that 
scolded the government’s hand in social affairs, saying that civil laws were “powerless to 
eradicate social instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences.”11 
While scholars have argued whether it was the World War that changed this ‘social 
instinct,’ or it was some sort of government intervention, or simply the evolution of moral 
thought largely separate from either, polls found a significant change in the public’s 
ideology favoring these government actions. Throughout the development of the mid-20th 
century, public opinion changed from viewing government as simply a protector of 
negative rights to an enforcer of positive ones, but in years after the war the measures of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Id.	  p.	  44.	  
10	  Executive	  Order	  9981.	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library	  and	  Museum.	  July	  26th,	  1948.	  
11	  Plessy	  v.	  Ferguson.	  163	  U.S.	  537.	  1896.	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the Truman administration served more as tokens than effective tools of social change. 
Half a decade later in 1955, Time magazine praised the “flowering of American 
capitalism” while lamenting the severe disconnect in this wealth explosion across racial 
lines. Employers still openly discriminated against minorities of all kinds and poverty 
was rampant. In response, across the next decade thirteen state commissions arose under 
the model of the FECP, with New York receiving over 9,000 complaints in its first 20 
years and finding over 20% of those cases deserving of some level of state action.12 
While the FECP itself was relatively ineffective, overseeing over 19,400 complaints with 
99.7% of them never seeing trial, the State commissions were steadily improving.13 With 
Congress unwilling to intervene and the federal government floundering in its mission, 
President Kennedy issued yet another Executive Order (10925) which mandated 
government to: 
“Consider and recommend additional affirmative steps which should be taken by 
executive departments and agencies to realize more fully the national policy of 
nondiscrimination…the contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that 
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, 
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”14 
While very similar to Truman’s executive order, this was the first that explicitly 
mentioned race and affirmative action together, as opposed to simple nondiscrimination 
that the previous orders outlined. President Kennedy actually superseded this executive 
order with another one15 later in 1963 that made affirmative action the official policy of 
the United States government, and extended its reach from pure federal employment to 
“grants, loans and other forms of financial assistance” to state and local governments, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Anderson,	  Terry	  H.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Fairness.	  p.	  55.	  
13	  Id.	  p.	  56.	  
14	  Executive	  Order	  10925.	  EEOC	  Historical	  Documents.	  March	  6,	  1961.	  
15	  Executive	  Order	  11114.	  EEOC	  Historical	  Documents.	  June	  22,	  1963.	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well as to most unions and employers, mandating nondiscrimination in their hiring 
practices in regard to race, creed, color, and national origin as well as folding affirmative 
action into US policy.16 For President Kennedy, this was as far as he was willing to go on 
affirmative action policies, saying that assigning quotas (as had begun to be discussed at 
the time) was “a mistake,” thinking that in doing so, the United States would “get into a 
good deal of trouble.”17 
 While Kennedy may have been uncomfortable going any further, his successor 
was not. With the administration of President Lyndon Johnson came the idea of racial 
‘preferences’ to serve as a catalyst for improved race relations after the civil rights acts 
were passed, using Title II and Title VII of the 1964 civil rights act as a basis for his 
system. The idea of preferences for a specific class of citizens was not a new one. The 
1789 version of the constitution favored the gentry class based solely on race and status. 
Later, after slavery ended Congress passed the Freedman’s bureau act to help former 
slaves receive land, education, funding, and support similar to Medicaid. The Social 
Security act of 1935 was a clear, nationalized, economic preference to help the poor more 
than the wealthy. In 1944, the G.I. bill of rights applied only to World War II veterans, 
but not necessarily to civilians at all.18 These acts outline federally discriminatory acts 
hardly contested in their time, and President Johnson used them as legal basis for 
institutionalized racial preferences. Famously, he gave a speech to Howard University in 
June of 1965 that outlined the government’s overt position on affirmative action policy: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Anderson,	  Terry	  H.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Fairness.	  p.	  72.	  	  
17	  Id.	  p.	  78.	  
18	  Id.	  p.	  80.	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“You do not wipe away the scars of the centuries by saying, “Now you are free to go 
where you want, and do as you desire…You do not take a person who for years has been 
hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then 
say, “You are free to compete with all the others.” And still justly believe you have been 
completely fair. Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our 
citizens must have the ability to walk through the gates. This is the next and more 
profound stage of the battle for civil rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity. 
We seek not just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory 
but equality as a fact and equality as a result.”19 
 
Before his term ended, President Johnson reinforced these powerful words with the 
establishment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC 
used a carrot-and-stick approach in conjunction with the Department of Justice to 
prosecute unions and employers who blocked Black members and employees, while 
simultaneously offering federal grants for the specific recruitment and training of 
potential Black employees.20 The Lyndon Johnson presidency saw the peak of a new 
wave of affirmative action policies that were ardently enforced. Over the course of the 
subsequent several decades, the United States saw a slow drawback of the various 
affirmative action policies put in place from 1941 through 1970, but have not been able to 
completely overturn the policy. Though preferences had been used sparingly throughout 
history to aid one group or another, the United States had never attempted such a 
comprehensive and widespread approach to any racial issue. Affirmative action was an 
experiment, and interestingly while there was relatively broad consensus that the policy 
was effectively working, it was on constitutional and ideological merits that the policy 
saw a steady decline in its scope throughout the next several decades. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson.	  “The	  United	  States	  Since	  1940	  –	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  New	  Deal	  Liberalism.”	  Howard	  University	  Address.	  June,	  1965.	  
20	  Anderson,	  Terry	  H.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Fairness.	  p.	  103.	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Part II: Chipping Away at Change 
 In the early 1970s, numerous lawsuits began to spring up surrounding the 
constitutionality of affirmative action’s forced governmental implementation in many 
areas, and the allowance of the use of the ‘quota’ system in others.21 While the Nixon 
administration, which was in power at the time, did not overtly condone these lawsuits, 
they took a rather laissez-faire approach compared to the previous several 
administrations. In his private memoirs from 1972, Nixon wrote that while he supported 
“numerical goals…as tools to measure progress which remedies the effect of past 
discrimination,” he did not believe that these remedies should be “applied in such a 
fashion as to, in fact, result in the imposition of quotas.”22 Despite these personal 
misgivings, the Nixon administration was relatively quiet on the affirmative action 
question, maintaining the status quo throughout much of the 1970s. In fact, a director of 
personnel management at the large defense contractor Lockheed, which was one of the 
first companies mandated to use and sanctioned for not properly implementing 
affirmative action said during the same time period, “face it, affirmative action as done its 
job. Without government surveillance we certainly wouldn’t have gone this much out of 
our way.”23 Studies showed that “substantial employment gains” in women and minority 
groups, especially in the 77,000 businesses and unions that held federal government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The	  quota	  system	  mandated	  that	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  seats	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  positions	  within	  a	  school	  or	  company	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  affirmative	  action	  policy	  had	  to	  be	  set-­‐aside	  for	  underrepresented	  racial	  groups,	  the	  definition	  of	  which	  changed	  slightly	  from	  industry	  to	  industry	  or	  state	  to	  state.	  See	  Id.	  p.	  126	  for	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	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  of	  these	  cases.	  
22	  Hugh	  David	  Graham.	  “Richard	  Nixon	  and	  Civil	  Rights:	  Explaining	  an	  Enigma.”	  
Presidential	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  26,	  No.	  1.	  p.	  422-­‐46.	  
23	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  Businessweek,	  January	  27th,	  1975.	  
C h a s a n 	  |	  13	  	  
contracts. Furthermore, there was double the percentage of black union workers and 
apprentices for skilled jobs, and black officials, managers, professionals, and skilled 
workers saw a 70% increase during this time. Gains were similarly seen in employment 
at universities, graduate schools, and high-skilled professions. The effect on white 
women’s opportunities was often even more dramatic than those of minority groups.24 
President Nixon – always a shrewd politician focused always on popular opinion – 
undoubtedly saw these figures and let affirmative action run its course. 
 The ‘Reagan Revolution’ saw a change from the tacit approval of the Nixon 
Administration to an intentional federal push to disassemble the mass of affirmative 
action policies and social institutions constructed in the previous four decades. While the 
new administration’s stance was clear from the outset, some wondered how effective any 
president could be. Fortune magazine wrote that while President Reagan was trying to 
find a means to phase out the policy, that it was be very difficult to do as “affirmative 
action is here to stay…[it] has a lot of momentum, and it is plainly easier to make 
speeches assailing preference than it is to slow down that locomotive.”25 However, 
President Reagan came into office just as national conversations about affirmative action 
policies were beginning to flare, as the Supreme Court had just handed down their 
opinion in Regents of California v. Bakke a little over a year earlier, which played a 
significant part in Reagan’s campaign.  
Following the precedent set by previous administrations, the Medical School at 
the University of California at Davis had a policy of setting aside 16 of their 100 seats for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Anderson,	  Terry	  H.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Fairness.	  p.	  159.	  
25	  Daniel	  Seligman.	  Fortune	  magazine	  Op-­‐Ed	  on	  affirmative	  action.	  April	  19th,	  1982.	  In:	  Anderson,	  Terry	  H.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Fairness.	  p.	  175.	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their annual incoming freshman class for “Blacks, Chicanos, Asians and American 
Indian” applicants, further establishing a separate admissions process for those places. 
The Court was not wholly persuaded by the argument put forth by UC system that 
“diversity in the classroom” justified intentional discriminatory action in their admissions 
process, and four justices voted to rule their actions unconstitutional. However, the Court 
was extremely divided, with five justices joining the majority opinion generally regarding 
the admissions pratice unconstitutional on the basis of the 14th amendment’s equal 
protection cause (but not on the specific grounds the Justice Powell put forth26), and four 
justices seeing the admissions process as illegal under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.27 
While these questions would be answered several decades later by the Court, the Bakke 
case created confusion as to what the binding precedent was, an opportunity which the 
Reagan Administration promptly pounced on.  
Arguing that quota-based affirmative action policies created “a new class of 
victims” by denying majority groups equal rights, President Reagan quickly directed the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to cut EEOC and OFCCP staffs by 12% and 34% 
respectively. Furthermore, the EEOC no longer sought out to remedy systemic cases of 
workplace discrimination, but instead handled cases of individual acts of discrimination, 
which decreased petitions for the former and increased petitions for the latter, which were 
harder to prove.28 While a survey of 120 of the largest corporations in the United States 
found that more than 95% of their CEOs agreed to the benefits of affirmative action and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Which	  said	  that	  race	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  plus-­‐factor	  but	  not	  use	  ex-­‐ante	  set	  asides,	  a	  point	  that	  no	  other	  justice	  joined	  in	  their	  opinion.	  
27	  Regents	  of	  the	  University	  of	  California	  v.	  Bakke.	  438	  U.S.	  265	  (1978).	  
28	  Federal	  Enforcement	  of	  Equal	  Employment	  Requirements,	  p.	  20-­‐24.	  In:	  Anderson,	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  H.	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  p.	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would nevertheless continue to use “numerical objectives to track the progress of women 
and minorities”29 in the workplace, the Reagan administration refused to yield, and began 
to shape the future of affirmative action policy in the Court with the successful 
nominations of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Sandra Day O’Conner, Antonin Scalia, 
and Anthony Kennedy after the failed nomination of Robert Bork. 
Reagan’s appointments to the Supreme Court spent the next decade narrowly 
shaping affirmative action policy, and were especially busy with affirmative action cases 
beginning in the late 1980s. In the City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, the Court was asked 
to examine the city of Richmond’s municipal quota policy of favoring minority-run 
businesses for government contracts when they saw less than 30% of the contract work 
being done without minority leadership. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor said 
that the 14th equal protection clause protects all citizens, and that the “only legitimate 
reason to use racial preference is to remedy past discrimination,” chastising the City of 
Richmond for putting forth “no evidence of past discrimination against Spanish-speaking, 
Oriental, Indian, Eskimos, or Aleut persons” in the city’s construction industry.30 This 
ruling led to a series of cases challenging other affirmative action policies, bringing a 
slew of reverse-discrimination cases to the Court. In Martin v. Wilks, the Court ruled that 
white firefighters in Jefferson County, Alabama should not have been excluded ex-ante 
from the hiring process that was aimed at purely black firefighters to promote racial 
balancing. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court upheld an 1866 law that 
allowed Brenda Patterson, a black woman, to sue and collect damages for general 
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harassment, but not for racial harassment, reversing the 1976 case of Runyon v. 
McCrary.31 Along the same lines, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, fifteen Filipino 
and Native American workers at a salmon cannery claimed that the businesses segregated 
mess halls and bunkhouses kept them on cannery lines and away from possible 
promotions, arguing a significant ‘disparate impact’ treatment of racial discrimination 
that had to be undone as per Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While it was a 5-4 
split decision, Justice White said in his majority opinion that “if the absence of minorities 
holding such skilled positions is due to a dearth [of qualified applicants, as it seems 
here],” then the company’s “selection methods or employment practices cannot be said to 
have had a ‘disparate impact’ on minorities.”32 In true legacy of the Reagan 
administration, all of his appointees lined up against the workers claim.  
The relatively quick change in the way the executive and judicial branches 
thought about affirmative action created a confusing national atmosphere. People were 
generally in favor of affirmative action policies, but were uncomfortable with the quota 
system. A pollster who had worked on the affirmative action question for much of the 
1980s and 1990s mused that his work showed that “if civil rights is defined as quotas, it’s 
a losing hand. If it’s defined as protections against discrimination and efforts to promote 
opportunity, then it will remain a mainstream value in American life,” further noting that 
a 1992 poll found that while 10% of the American public were in favor of quotas, only 
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  v.	  McLean	  Credit	  Union.	  491	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10% were against civil rights policies generally.33 The political tactics of the Democratic 
Party captured the ideological irony that defined the 1990s. Trying to take back control of 
the national government, Democrats tread a fine line. They supported diversity but were 
careful not to overtly endorse affirmative action policies as they stood at the time, which 
proved to be a highly successful tactic. By 1995, 70% of the Fortune 50 companies had 
institutionalized diversity programs, with another 12% of them actively putting them in 
place. The government would give out over 50,000 permanent residency visas a year in a 
diversity-based lottery focused on education, work experience, and country of origin, 
bringing in immigrants from over 150 countries.34 
By this time, the President Clinton had been sworn into the oval office and, like 
Nixon, essentially aligned his opinion on affirmative action with the publics. In a speech 
in 1994 he rebuffed “unjustified prejudice of…the unqualified over [the] qualified…” 
leading him to fight against “numerical quotas…[and] reverse discrimination,” while 
simultaneously noting that while “affirmative action hasn’t always been perfect, and it 
should not go on forever…the evidence suggests, indeed screams, that that day has not 
come. The job of ending discrimination in this country is not over.” In that same speech, 
Clinton coined the term that would become synonymous with his administration – “mend 
it, don’t end it.” In line with this rhetoric, he directed all government offices under his 
authority to subject affirmative action policies to a four-step test. Essentially, the various 
programs were acceptable as long as they did not include quotas, reverse discrimination, 
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  Press.	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preferences for unqualified individuals, and could only be continued as long as there was 
a need for the policy generally.35  
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court continued to strike down affirmative action cases, 
sometimes speaking loudest when they did not take cases at all. That was the case in 
Hopwood v. Texas, the first case to overturn a schools admissions policy since Bakke 
nearly twenty years earlier. Cheryl Hopwood, after being rejected from the University of 
Texas law school, found that she had much stronger academic credentials than several 
minority peers. She sued for discrimination on 14th amendment equal protection grounds 
and the case reached the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. When the University was found 
to be using different admissions standards for different races, several more white 
applicants joined the case and Hopwood prevailed. However, the Supreme Court decided 
not to take the case, as by the time it reached them the University of Texas had changed 
the admissions policy for their law school. Oddly, the effect of Hopwood v. Texas, as it 
did not reach the Supreme Court, was to bind universities only within the Fifth Circuits 
jurisdiction – that is to say to bind admissions practices in Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Texas.36 The law of the land regarding affirmative action policy was becoming 
increasingly confusing with each notable case. So far, the modern court had chipped 
away at affirmative action policy by handing down opinions saying what was not 
constitutional in a piecemeal case-by-case fashion, but had not directly addressed the 
question of what was constitutionally valid. In rejecting to hear Hopwood, the Court 
created more confusion as different parts of the country had to adhere to fairly disparate 	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laws regarding just how far affirmative action could go. While they had avoided a 
comprehensive ruling for the better part of a decade, the Court was setting the stage for a 
landmark opinion.  
Over the course of the next several years, dichotomous reactions to the Court’s 
silence on the affirmative action continued to build. The University of Texas system put 
in a program that gave automatic admission to any high school student in the top 10% of 
their class. The UC system put in place a similar policy but only for the top 4% of their 
student body, but it excluded Berkley and UCLA. On the other hand, the University of 
Virginia stopped using their point-based system, making race a vague and qualitative 
factor instead of a hard quantitative one, and the University of Massachusetts simply 
reduced the impact of race and ethnicity in their admissions decisions altogether. 
Meanwhile, many organizations, government agencies, and schools were adding sexual 
orientation to their policy. Culturally, the United States was seeing what experts called a 
racial ‘blurring’ as ethnicities mixed across generations and became less distinct from one 
another.37 As one of the catalysts of this national confusion, the Court needed an 
opportunity to bring solidity to the affirmative action question, which they got in the 
Michigan cases – Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. 
The two cases, heard together, concerned the admissions criterion at the 
University of Michigan and its law school. In Gratz v. Bollinger Jennifer Gratz and 
Patrick Hamacher, both white, were rejected from the undergraduate college of 
Literature, Science and the Arts at the University of Michigan. The school had a policy of 
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using a 150-point scale to rank applicant, with 100 points being needed to guarantee ones 
admission to the University. Gratz and Hammacher sued together when they discovered 
that the University game underrepresented minority groups an automatic 20-point bonus 
in their internal scale, almost twice as much as a perfect SAT or ACT score would 
receive, and six times better than an ‘outstanding essay.’ The Court was not favorable to 
this policy in oral arguments, but was relatively sympathetic to the underlying argument 
for the policy, with Justice Ginsburg saying that the “constitution doesn’t implicate” the 
underlying qualitative standards by which preferences are granted, just how they were 
implemented in this case. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist clarified the 
Court’s opinion for the first time, saying that “all racial classification…must be strictly 
scrutinized” and that race could be a “‘plus’ in an application” but it had to be “flexible 
enough to consider all pertinent points of diversity,” such as artistic ability, athletic 
ability, personality, etc. Using this framework, the Court held the undergraduate 
admissions program at the University of Michigan unconstitutional.38 
Despite this clarification, the more impactful opinion came with the Grutter case, 
heard concurrently with Gratz as mentioned above. Unlike the undergraduate system, the 
law school used a qualitative system of racial preferences in their admissions practices. 
Barbara Grutter, a well-qualified applicant to the law school was denied admission and 
sued on 14th Amendment equal protection clause, as well as under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, believing that she was denied admission based on her (white) race. 
The law schools explicit policy was that they used race as a ‘predominant’ factor in 
admissions decisions, and in their defense in oral arguments the law school argued that 	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this policy was in line with other decisions, citing a compelling state interest to pursue 
this policy until they achieved a ‘critical mass’ of students from minority groups.39 In 
Gratz, this ‘critical mass’ argument was brought up as well, which Kolbo – arguing for 
the petitioners – called “too amorphous, too ill-defined, [and] too indefinite to be a basis 
for racial preference” in his closing arguments. When pressed on this point, Payton – 
arguing on behalf of the University of Michigan – argued that the question brought with 
it “a false precision that everybody wants…and I don’t think it exactly works like 
that…we have a lot of experience as…an educational institution about what has happened 
on our campus and what has worked.”40 Similar arguments were made in Grutter, and the 
Court agreed in a close 5-4 split with the law school’s interpretation. Justice O’Connor, 
writing for the majority, said that the ‘critical mass’ policy was not the same as the quota 
system used by the undergraduate college, and that all evidence pointed to the law school 
using a “highly individualistic [and] holistic review” of each applicant with “no 
mechanical, predetermined diversity bonuses based on race or ethnicity.” But the most 
stirring and controversial part of her opinion was in addressing the timeline of affirmative 
action policy, as theoretically it would not always be necessary if equality of opportunity 
were to make significant gains along ethnic and racial lines: 
“It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further 
an interest in student body diversity…since that time, the number of minority 
applicant with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that 25 
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to 
further the interest approved today.”41 
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While Justice O’Connor’s opinion did not solve the affirmative action question 
indefinitely, it gave a solid opinion from the Court for the rest of the country to follow, 
importantly finding that diversity in higher education was definitely a compelling state 
interest that passed strict scrutiny. Therefore, a narrowly tailored and holistic approach to 
race and ethnicity in college admissions practices following the University of Michigan 
law school system would inevitably hold up against all complaints. For the time being, 
the affirmative action question seemed to be settled, and despite the complicated case of 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 in 199742, 
affirmative action policy has essentially stayed the same and gone unchallenged for 
nearly a decade. 
That is to say, until the Fall of 2012, when Abigail Fisher brought suit against the 
University of Texas for violating the precedent set out in the Michigan cases in Fisher v. 
University of Texas. Throughout the previous decade, the research on affirmative action 
policy has developed with more hard data revealing some unsettling truths about the 
policy, necessitating another Supreme Court intervention. This research has drawn out 
proofs supporting a part of Justice Thomas’ dissent in Grutter, where he pointed to 
Proposition 209 that barred the UC school system from granting preferential treatment on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Parents	  v.	  Community	  Schools	  was	  a	  case	  where	  the	  policy	  of	  assigning	  students	  to	  school	  districts	  based	  in	  part	  on	  race	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  desegregation	  and	  integration	  in	  Seattle,	  WA	  and	  Louisville,	  KY	  were	  challenged.	  The	  Court	  handed	  down	  a	  4-­‐1-­‐4	  opinion	  striking	  down	  the	  policies,	  finding	  hem	  not	  narrowly	  tailored	  enough	  to	  stay	  standing.	  However,	  Justice	  Robert’s	  majority	  opinion	  still	  upheld	  the	  core	  opinion	  in	  the	  Michigan	  cases	  stating	  that	  racial	  diversity	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  compelling	  state	  interest,	  and	  therefore	  ruling	  narrowly	  in	  this	  case.	  Parents	  
Involved	  in	  Community	  Schools	  v.	  Seattle	  School	  District	  No.	  1.	  551	  U.S.	  701	  (2007).	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the basis of race, but saw diversity and academic achievements nonetheless, a topic 
which will be discussed in significant detail in Chapter 5. 
As mentioned above, in the confusion of affirmative action politics post-Hopwood 
but pre-Grutter and Gratz, the University of Texas put in place a plan that gave automatic 
admission to one of the UT-system schools to any student in the top 10% of their 
graduating high school class. While this policy was implemented with racial benefits 
specifically in mind, as many students in the top 10% of predominantly Black or Latino 
schools often times could not compete with better, predominantly White public high 
schools, it was applied to all students regardless of race. The policy was extremely 
successful, dramatically increasing the number of underrepresented minorities in the UT 
system. However, the students who attended UT systems schools as automatic admits 
from this top 10% plan take up around 81% of the annual incoming student body. For the 
rest of the incoming class, the University of Texas at Austin also uses the qualitative 
race-based metrics outlined in the Michigan cases to promote diversity within their 
student body. Abigail Fisher, who was rejected from the University of Texas, sued on 
14th Amendment Equal Protection grounds, saying that the top 10% plan had ‘done its 
job’ and that the seemingly ‘extra’ help that underrepresented minorities get in the few 
remaining spots in the UT system goes beyond Grutter’s constitutional understanding. 
Fisher’s case made similar arguments to the petitioners in the Michigan cases, saying that 
the UT school system admissions policy was “tailoring to the unknown,” calling for more 
concrete metrics, an argument that Justice Scalia was sympathetic to, saying that the 
critical mass doctrine was misguiding because “it assumes numbers. Call it [instead] a 
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cloud, or something.”43 Fisher’s case did not necessarily call for Grutter to be overturned, 
but it presented arguments very similar to those used against the University of Michigan 
in the original oral arguments. The case is made even more interesting due to the fact that 
Justice Kagan recused herself from hearing the case, as she was serving as Solicitor 
General making arguments on behalf of this specific case before she was nominated and 
eventually confirmed to the Supreme Court. 
As the introduction discussed, over the course of the last few years there has been 
another question raised – is affirmative action actually effective? As noted in the 
introduction, the debate of the last several decades has largely presupposed the 
importance of affirmative action policy in the pursuit of underrepresented minority’s 
upward social and economic mobility. Recently, the development of the mismatch 
hypothesis has challenged that claim. While Fisher v. University of Texas did not 
explicitly address the mismatch hypothesis, the Court is not ignorant of such arguments, 
and can analyze those argument’s merits while judging the best way to decide the most 
recent challenge to affirmative action. 
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  Fisher	  v.	  University	  of	  Texas.	  Docket	  No.	  11-­‐345.	  Opinion	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  handed	  down.	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Chapter 2: The American Philosophy 
 One of the main reasons that affirmative action policies are so interesting to me is 
that the debate surrounding them are, in my view, essentially a debate about our political 
values as Americans. While I think the distinction is inherently flawed, the affirmative 
action debate has largely been framed as a clash between our civic values of liberty and 
equality. The affirmative action question is hard to answer when put in these terms, 
starting with questions arising from the very preamble to our Constitution. Does the 
systematic aiding of one racial group serve to “promote the general welfare” because they 
were institutionally disadvantaged and disenfranchised for centuries, or do these tactics 
correct discrimination with discrimination, trodding on our civic promise to uphold 
“blessings of liberty” that our founders fought so hard to achieve?44 Regardless of what 
side of the argument one ascribes to, both those favoring some constriction of liberty to 
promote equality or those unwilling to help the pursuit of equality by surrendering some 
basic liberty will agree that the main goal of the Constitution was to ensure the posterity 
of our nation. With that view in mind, I take the position that affirmative action policies 
can be argued from both the side of liberty as well as equality without sacrificing the core 
characteristics of either. I also advocate the view that if the original framer’s intention, as 
well as the intention of the framer’s of the relevant amendments, was to ‘freeze’ their 
morals in the text of the constitution, affirmative action policies reflect those moral 
values regardless of the lens through with one views them. 
 The experience of Black Americans throughout our history has been the 
experience of citizens struggling to achieve both liberty and equality. The struggle for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Preamble	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution.	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equality is the easier one to describe. From overt racism as slaves, 3/5ths of other citizens, 
and a segregated class of citizens, Black Americans have only very recently been allowed 
to function with equal civic rights on a national level. This is not to say that equality has 
been achieved by any means – there was a news story that grabbed national attention in 
early April about a high school prom being de-segregated for the first time ever45 – but 
rather that most obvious forms of racial discrimination have been removed from society. 
Still, there are examples of implicit inequality subtler than forced segregation, yet equally 
as alarming. The American Journal of Public Health estimates that over 886,000 deaths 
could have been prevented from 1991 to 2000 if Black Americans had received the same 
level of care as Whites.46 Blacks are 10.1 times more likely that Whites to enter prison for 
drug offenses.47 As of 2001, Blacks and Hispanics are three times as likely as Whites to 
be poor.48 Furthermore, around 24% of Blacks and 20% of Hispanics experience housing 
difficulty, compared to only 10% of Whites.49 This snapshot of American society today 
goes on and on. Perhaps most shockingly is to contrast our racial inequities with those of 
significantly less prosperous nations around the world, as studies have shown that “Black 
immigrants from regions of the world where their race is in the majority report better 
health than other Black Americans,” even in relatively poor areas like central and South 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Valerie	  Strauss.	  “Georgia	  Students	  Fight	  Segregated	  Proms.”	  Washington	  Post.	  April	  5th,	  2013.	  
46	  January	  W.	  Payne.	  “Dying	  for	  Basic	  Care.”	  Washington	  Post.	  December	  21st,	  2004.	  
47	  “Targeting	  Blacks:	  Drug	  Law	  Enforcement	  and	  Race	  in	  the	  United	  States.”	  Human	  
Rights	  Watch.	  May,	  2008.	  
48	  Kenneth	  Feingold	  &	  Laura	  Wherry.	  “Race,	  Ethnicity,	  and	  Economic	  Well-­‐Being.”	  
Urban	  Institute.	  March	  18th,	  2004.	  	  
49	  Id.	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Africa, the West Indies, & central America, not to mention Europe.50 Black Americans 
have not had an equitable experience in America by any means, but in their fight for true 
equality they have to convince political and legal scholars that correcting these past and 
present injustices through policies like affirmative action would not fundamentally come 
in conflict with our American civic values. Regardless of how judicious or fair you find 
that requirements to be, it is a reality that the underrepresented minorities of America 
must face to effect real, lasting change. 
 The three prongs of American civil right are liberty, property, and equality. 
However, these rights often come in conflict with each other. The struggle to promote 
equality to the same level as liberty and property has been a difficult one for Black 
Americans to accomplish, and is still in progress today. In the mid-19th century, President 
Polk declared, “All distinctions of birth or rank have been abolished. All are entitled to 
equal rights and equal protection,”51 but he referred only to American citizens, which did 
not include Blacks at the time. However, the extension of our civic values to all 
Americans (regardless of race) is a topic that was hotly debated and voted upon as a core 
factor of the election of 1860 – the election of Abraham Lincoln. In the first presidential 
debate between Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln espoused his understanding of 
our inherent rights under the Constitution: “…there is no reason in the world why the 
negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  “Study	  Suggests	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Harms	  Health.”	  Science	  Daily	  News.	  U.C.	  
Irvine	  department	  of	  sociology.	  September	  9th,	  2005.	  
51	  Celeste	  Michelle	  Condit	  &	  John	  Louis	  Lucaites.	  Crafting	  Equality:	  America’s	  Anglo-­
African	  World.	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  1993.	  p.	  78-­‐9.	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Independence, the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”52 However, so Black 
Americans had to desperately fight for these core civic values of liberty, equality, 
happiness, etc. in a way that white Americans were already intimately familiar with. They 
first had to start from the premise that “all men are created equally free” universally, as 
Lincoln argued. We take that for granted today, but at the time it was harder to push. 
As our nation’s founders were influenced by political theorists musing on man’s 
exit from the state of nature (and Locke especially), we can apply equality to liberty to 
strengthen its argument. Rather than liberty and equality coming into conflict with each 
other, the American system has promoted the idea that “equal liberty was originally the 
position, and is still the birthright of all men,”53 meaning to Black Americans that if this 
natural right was to serve as a foundational value, then it had to include the right to 
“appropriate my own body to my use.”54 Coming at the point from the other side, the 
Descartes idea that simple ability to reason is what makes man unique also must then 
give man the ability “to use what is respectively theirs,”55 thus deriving human equality 
from its liberty. 
If our liberty underlines our equality, then granting equal opportunity therefore 
becomes a function of granting equal liberty. This argument sounds like an indictment of 
affirmative action policies, as critics would argue that programs that explicitly favor one 
race do not conform to the idea of ‘equal liberty.’ That argument is weak and naïve. In 	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  Abraham	  Lincoln.	  “The	  Lincoln-­‐Douglas	  Debates,	  First	  Debate.”	  Teaching	  
American	  History.	  TeachingAmericanHistory.org.	  August	  21,	  1858.	  Ottawa,	  Illinois.	  Accessed	  April	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  2013.	  
53	  Words	  from	  The	  North	  Star,	  September	  29th	  1848.	  In:	  Condit	  &	  Lucaites:	  Crafting	  
Equality.	  p.	  80.	  
54	  Frederick	  Douglass.	  The	  Liberator:	  Letter	  to	  Thomas	  Auld.	  September	  3rd,	  1848.	  
55	  Frederick	  Douglass.	  Personal	  Papers.	  May	  12th	  1854.	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the previous chapter I quoted the famous line from President Lyndon Johnson outlining 
the weakness of the foregoing argument, stating simply that that “You do not take a 
person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the 
starting line of a race and then say, “You are free to compete with all the others.” And 
still justly believe you have been completely fair.”56 Recently losing ground in the House 
and Senate, the conservative party (the modern political party pushing against affirmative 
action policies) implicitly recognized the weakness of this argument in their annual 
conference. Jeb Bush, the Governor of Florida and a notable conservative leader, 
addressed the difficulty of securing equal liberty in modern America: 
"It is not a validation of our conservative principles if we can only point to the 
increasingly rare individual who overcomes adversity and succeeds in America. Here’s 
reality: if you’re fortunate enough to count yourself among the privileged, much of the 
rest of the nation is drowning…In our country today, if you’re born poor, if your parents 
didn’t go to college, if you don’t know your father, if English isn’t spoken at home, then 
the odds are stacked against you. You are more likely to stay poor today than at any other 
time since World War II.”57 
 
 If scholars from President Johnson, who presided over the peak of affirmative 
action, to Governor Jeb Bush, who has seen the least effective form of affirmative action, 
can both agree on the necessity not simply of liberty but of equal liberty, then the 
argument becomes more convincing. Today, we do not speak of liberty as absolutely as 
our founding father did, but rather of the ‘equal opportunity’ as the modern substitute. 
With drastic disparities in wealth and opportunity between full citizens, this distinction 
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makes sense. I argue that the early concept of liberty and the debates surrounding it are 
akin to this modern understanding of equal liberty. 
 As a final point, Lincoln points out that the “abstract principle” of equality of 
citizens is core to the “original construction of society” which must be kept in view “as a 
great fundamental principle” of our civil system. With this knowledge, Lincoln remains 
practical, understanding the reality that “in no society that ever did exist, or ever shall be 
formed, was or can the equality asserted among the members of the human race, be 
practically enforced and carried out.”58 Lincoln and affirmative action advocates 
understand this claim, but pursue equal liberty nonetheless. Much as the “city on a hill” 
ideology in Matthew 5:1459 will never be perfectly attained neither will the perfect 
equality of liberty. However, the constant pursuit of this equality of liberty is exactly 
what affirmative action policies are trying to accomplish – a task that is distinctly 
American. 
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Chapter 3: The Constitutionality of Modern Affirmative Action 
As Chapter 1, Part II explained, the Supreme Court has been instrumental in the 
systematic dismantling of affirmative action’s scope over the last several decades. For 
those not familiar with constitutional interpretation, the jargon can get confusing. 
Essentially, citizens frequently sued in a myriad of cases against affirmative action 
policies on the basis that they violate the Constitution’s 14th amendment, which stipulates 
that no state shall deprive a person of several rights, including the equal protection of the 
laws. The various affirmative action cases have most often asked the Supreme Court to 
explain what this clause means regarding affirmative action, and the answer has changed 
many times with the different ideologies of Justices in different eras. While some Justices 
believe that any form of affirmative action is justified as “we are not far distant from an 
overtly discriminatory past, [with] the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality 
remain[ing] painfully evident in our communities and schools,”60 others draw a more 
narrow line, calling broad affirmative action policies a constitutional violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, as well as Title VI of the 1964 civil rights act.61 The later 
interpretation sees these Congressional acts as absolving any distinctions that explicitly 
favor race in any way, regardless of past injustices. Those who adhere to that narrow 
constitutional view of affirmative action argue that the 14th Amendment (and other 
similar laws) created a ‘colorblind’ constitution, and regardless of past injustices, we 
cannot use similarly unjust practices to correct them.  
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However, I argue that it is not perfectly clear that those who drafted and ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment intended the clause to be ‘constitutionally colorblind,’ an 
argument often evoked by opponents of race-conscious admissions, and that those sorts 
of arguments came much later than 1868. As some critics of the foregoing view point out, 
the Equal Protection Clause can be read to require only that the States provide “the equal 
protection of laws,” not  “the protection of equal laws,” meaning that while the laws had 
to be protected uniformly, they did not have to uniformly apply to each individual or 
group. In debating the 14th amendment, the 39th Congress actually considered and 
ultimately rejected a provision that would undeniably require a colorblind government.62 
On March 9th, 1866 the Senate voted 7-38 to defeat the proposed amendment stating that 
“no State…shall recognize any distinction between citizens…on account of race or color 
or previous condition of slavery,” further stating that “all citizens, without distinction of 
race, color or previous condition of slavery, shall be protected in the full and equal 
enjoyment and exercise of all their civil and political rights.”63 If this rejected provision 
became the codified text of the 14th Amendment, then affirmative action cases would fall 
apart, because the policy recognizes and allows codified differences among classes of 
citizens on account of race. While explicitly forbidden in the foregoing amendment, our 
Equal Protection Clause instead tones down that language, restricting the State’s 
authority in enacting provisions that deny the equal protection of laws, rather than 
restricting them from enacting laws that draw distinctions on race altogether. These 
arguments were highlighted in the Brief in Opposition in the case of Fisher v. University 	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of Texas as examples of the legislative intent of the 14th amendment, showing (at least) 
the ambiguity of the Equal Protection Clause’s purpose for future use and 
interpretation.64 
Other scholars see the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as more 
narrowly tailored than the foregoing interpretation. Political theorist Michael McConnell 
sees the most clear-cut purpose of the act as providing constitutional authority to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, which was shot down by President Johnson before Congress had a 
veto-proof majority, and thus served to outlaw ‘Black Codes’ which were beginning to 
arise at end of the Civil War.65 Scholars such as Dworkin read broad framers intent into 
this action, seeing the move to protect the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as an example of the 
framers “declar[ing] a principle of quite breathtaking scope and power: the principle that 
government must treat everyone as of equal status and with equal concern.”66 McConnell 
rejects this expansive view, saying that there is no real historical basis for the notion of 
“equal concern,” a phrase so “subjective and indeterminate that it is highly unlikely that 
the practical statesmen of the 39th Congress, who deeply distrusted the courts, would have 
employed it.67 However, despite this disagreement with Dworkin’s more expansive view 
of the 14th Amendment, McConnell’s does find some other, broader readings of the 
Equal Protection Clause through the lens of originalist interpretation. As example, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Brief	  for	  University	  of	  Texas	  as	  Brief	  in	  Opposition	  for	  Writ	  of	  Certiorari	  Supporting	  Respondents,	  Fisher	  v.	  University	  of	  Texas	  at	  Austin	  631	  F.3d	  213,	  226	  (5th	  Cir.	  2011)	  
65	  Michael	  W.	  McConnell.	  “The	  Importance	  of	  Humility	  in	  Judicial	  Review:	  A	  Comment	  on	  Ronald	  Dworkin’s	  Moral	  Reading	  of	  the	  Constitution.”	  65	  Fordham	  L.	  
Rev.	  1269.	  (1997).	  66	  Ronald	  Dworkin.	  Freedom’s	  Law:	  The	  Moral	  Reading	  of	  the	  American	  Constitution.	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  April,	  1997.	  p.	  10.	  67	  Michael	  W.	  McConnell.	  “The	  Importance	  of	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  in	  Judicial	  Review.”	  p.	  1282.	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points to congressional actions outlawing educational segregation that only failed due to 
an opposition filibuster (far more rare at the time than today).68 McConnell says he 
believes that these attempts show congressional commitment to strict equality, without 
regard to arbitrary distinctions based on race “or other morally irrelevant distinctions.”69 
However he concedes that these action could also be argued to show the theory of 
‘absolute limited equality,’ a concept that promotes equal civil rights but not equal social 
rights, meaning that if affirmative action policies were read with the later view of 
equality they could be justified using this wider concept of social rights which some 
scholars argue underlie our de jure civil rights.70 
However, opposed to all of the foregoing points of view are legal scholars who 
argue against these lines of reasoning by discounting the practice of using legislative 
intent as a method of interpreting both constitutional amendments and general passages 
of bills altogether. Advocates pushing against constitutional interpretation that uses 
legislative records as part of their inquiry into the case at hand call the “legislative 
power…the power to make laws, not the power to make legislators…” and that 
“whatever Congress has not itself prescribed is left to be resolved by the executive or 
(ultimately) judicial branch.”71 However, the major drawback to this argument is that it 
ignores what is intentionally left out of the lawmaking process. The gaps that Justice 
Scalia refers to in the quote above are especially important in a case like this, where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 947 (1995). 69	  Michael	  W.	  McConnell.	  “The	  Importance	  of	  Humility	  in	  Judicial	  Review.”	  p.	  1283.	  70	  For	  a	  lengthier	  discussion	  see:	  Earl	  M.	  Maltz.	  Civil	  Rights,	  the	  Constitution,	  and	  
Congress,	  1863-­1869,	  at	  68,	  157-­‐58	  (1990).	  
71	  Antonin	  Scalia.	  A	  Matter	  of	  Interpretation,	  Federal	  Courts	  and	  the	  Law	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1992.	  P.	  35.	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judges ignoring legislative intent could look at only the letter of the law and infer that 
equal protection doctrine under the 14th amendment was meant to restrict acts pushing 
positive rights in the way that affirmative action attempts to do. This restrictive method 
dispenses of any gaps in legislation as being intentionally put there, and by filling these 
gaps with their own interpretation of the lawmakers meaning, Judges become an 
oligarchic lawmaking body far exceeding their separation of powers mandate that Justice 
Scalia accuses backers of legislative intent of doing in their framework. If the appellate 
courts of the judicial branch ignore the legislative history of a provision, then they can 
craft opinions that form policies that the legislature did not want, they go beyond 
deciding on the constitutional merits of a particular law and cross over into the realm of 
the political merits of the policy. 
Furthermore, the secondary argument that legislative intent is flawed due to 
committee arguments being used by one side, weighed against House floor arguments 
used by the other side72 as evidence is somewhat stunted in this case as well, as the 39th 
Congress actually voted against the amendment 7-38. Whereas legislative intent may not 
be proper or its use perfect in many cases, in deciding the future of affirmative action 
policy it is vitally important to see the gaps that were intentionally left in of the 14th 
Amendment by looking at what was rejected in its crafting process, which will give 
judges the ability to get a greater understanding of the scope of the final amendment’s 
control and use in our society. 
As further evidence outlining the intent of the 14th Amendment as the 39th 
Congress envisioned it, that session of Congress (and its surrounding Congresses) 	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  Id.	  p.	  36	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actually have rich histories of disparate treatment based on race. The strongest of these 
examples are the appropriations bills passed to fund the “National Association for the 
Relief of Destitute Colored Women and Children” for the purpose of “supporting such 
aged or indigent and destitute colored women and children…”73 which was 
reincorporated for additional funding in 186674 and again more strongly in 1867, 
expanding the funding “for the relief of freedmen or destitute colored people in the 
District of Columbia.”75 76  
Despite the several foregoing arguments that could be used to justify the 
continued use of modern affirmative action policies, the reality is that the United States is 
on a judicially unsustainable course to meet the end of affirmative action in a mutually 
satisfactory manner for both black Americans and our republic. President Roosevelt’s 
Executive Order 8802 in 1941 saw the goal of government (with respect to affirmative 
action) to be to provide for “the full and equitable participation of all workers”77 that 
eventually extended from defense industries to all areas of government under President 
Truman in 1948, and to the general public through the Civil Rights Act under President 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Congressional	  Globe.	  38th	  Congress,	  2nd	  session.	  Act	  of	  February	  14,	  1863,	  ch.	  33,	  12	  Stat.	  650,	  650.	  
74	  Congressional	  Globe.	  40th	  Congress,	  1st	  session.	  Act	  of	  July	  28,	  1866,	  ch.	  296,	  14	  Stat.	  310,	  317.	  
75	  Congressional	  Globe.	  41st	  Congress,	  1st	  session.	  Resolution	  of	  March	  29,	  1867,	  No.	  25,	  15	  Stat.	  26.	  
76	  These	  acts	  and	  a	  discussion	  of	  them	  can	  be	  found	  in:	  Eric	  Schnapper,	  Affirmative	  
Action	  and	  the	  Legislative	  History	  of	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment,	  71	  Va.	  L.	  Rev.	  753,	  762-­‐75,	  778-­‐82	  (1985);	  Jed	  Rubenfeld,	  Affirmative	  Action,	  107	  Yale	  L.J.	  427,	  430-­‐31	  (1997);	  Andrew	  Kull.	  The	  Color-­Blind	  Constitution.	  Harvard	  University	  Press	  (1994).	  
77	  Exec.	  Order	  No.	  8802,	  3	  C.F.R.	  (June	  18,	  1941)	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Lyndon B. Johnson in Title II78 and Title VII79 respectively.80 Regardless of the 14th 
amendments intent and use in the later half of the 19th century, as Chapter 1 pointed out, 
the right to positively act for the benefit of institutionally disenfranchised and 
disadvantaged citizens has been judicially chipped away throughout the later years of the 
20th through the early years of the 21st century. Each case in affirmative action decided by 
the Supreme Court in the modern era is difficult to criticize in itself because they each, in 
their own way, represent our American value of liberty, but does so in a systematic way 
trending away from the recognition of past actions that trampled on that same value 
system that affirmative action is trying to correct. In Miller v. Johnson the Court saw the 
“central mandate” of the 14th amendments equal protection clause to mean “race 
neutrality in governmental decision making,”81 quickly imposing “the strictest of judicial 
scrutiny” on a cases concerning race such as in Adarand v. Pena, a subsequent case of the 
same year.82 While Adarand said that racial classification had to be “necessary to further 
a compelling governmental interest” and be “narrowly tailored to that end,”83 affirmative 
action cases have repeatedly not met this standard, which have subsequently led to a 
severe constricting of the implementation of the policy or the effectiveness of whatever 
does finally get implemented.  
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  Pertaining	  to	  public	  facilities	  including	  private	  businesses	  that	  sold	  to	  the	  public	  like	  hotels,	  movie	  theatres,	  etc	  
79	  Pertaining	  to	  all	  firms	  with	  25	  or	  more	  employees	  
80	  Anderson,	  Terry	  H.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Fairness:	  A	  History	  of	  Affirmative	  Action.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004.	  p.	  7,	  30,	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81	  Miller	  v.	  Johnson,	  515	  U.S.	  900,	  904	  (1995).	  
82	  Adarand	  Constructors,	  Inc.	  V.	  Pena,	  515	  U.S.	  200,	  224	  (1995).	  
83	  Id.	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The court has rejected the affirmative action notion of acting in most cases under 
the general language of the aforementioned executive orders and Civil Rights Acts, 
saying that “[T]he mere recitation of a benign or legitimate purpose” is not an “automatic 
shield which protects against any inquiry” into race-based preferences.84 Right now, the 
court is being pushed to overturn the modern understanding of affirmative action outlined 
in Grutter v. Bollinger that imposes strict requirements for university admissions, saying 
that universities may only utilize affirmative action principles that can favor 
“underrepresented minorities” only if they use the applicants race on neutral footing with 
other application materials in a holistic fashion,85 ruling in a concurrent case that an 
admission action that uses race as a mere “predominant” factor was too wide of an 
interpretation.86 Critics of the policy are pleading the court in the case before it to put the 
final nail in affirmative action, asking specifically for a “decision that ends once and for 
all any racial preferences”87 regardless of their strict use, intent, or recognition of need in 
our society. While Fisher, the petitioner in the case before the court, does not explicitly 
ask the court to overturn the precedent outlined in Grutter, the court can overturn it 
regardless. As outlined in Chapter 1, since 1970 affirmative action’s critics have quickly 
taken the policy and greatly decreased its effect on those who it attempts to help – only 
adding fuel to its opponent’s arguments. As it stands now post-Grutter, if the policy can 
only be used until underrepresented minorities constitute a ‘critical mass’ of students in 
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  City	  of	  Richmond	  v.	  J.A.	  Croson	  Co.,	  488	  U.S.	  469	  (1989).	  
85	  Grutter	  v.	  Bollinger,	  539	  U.S.	  306	  (2003).	  
86	  Gratz	  v.	  Bollinger,	  549	  U.S.	  244	  (2003).	  
87	  Brief	  for	  University	  of	  Texas	  as	  Amicus	  Curiae	  by	  the	  American	  Civil	  Liberties	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  for	  Writ	  of	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  Petitioner,	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  631	  F.3d	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  226	  (5th	  Cir.	  2011)	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our higher education system and various professional fields, then if the policy was proven 
to actually make that racial gap worse, it would (and should) be almost immediately 
struck down, a topic which will be discussed in detail in the ongoing chapters. 
If the goal of public policy is to achieve an end, and more specifically the goal of 
affirmative action is to take “affirmative steps…to realize more fully the policy of 
nondiscrimination…and to ensure that applicants are employed…and are treated during 
employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin,”88 then 
paradoxically the race aspect of affirmative action must be scrapped in lieu of an 
economic measurement for it to survive in its intended effect. While the constitutional 
arguments for an expansive affirmative action policy have definite backing, the Supreme 
Court is highly unlikely to re-expand the law’s provisions, as they are still populated by a 
conservative majority, and have largely been persuaded by the Grutter and Gratz 
interpretations as generally correct. Furthermore, even a re-expansion of affirmative 
action would not necessarily fix the systemic problems underlying affirmative action and 
policy’s recent ineffectiveness, and could even make it worse, as Chapter 5 discusses in 
great detail. Therefore, despite the political backlash that changing affirmative action to a 
class-based system will inevitably incite, to drastically aid in the success of the program 
change is necessary. I will get into more detail about the constitutionality and effect of 
such a change in the next chapter. 
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  Exec.	  Order	  No.	  10925,	  3	  C.F.R.	  (1961).	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Chapter 4: Is Class-Based Affirmative Action Constitutional? 
 Though the constitutional merits of the current form of affirmative action are 
being weighed and measured in the Supreme Court with Fisher v. Texas awaiting a final 
judicial decision, the debate has moved away from the original intent of the law to the 
merits of its methods. As outlined in previous chapters, due to the overwhelming divide 
in public (and judicial) opinion of the constitutionality of the law affirmative action in a 
race-based form has effectually decreased continually since the 1970s. Therefore, in 
order to save the intended effect of affirmative action – to continue providing positive 
governmental steps to systematically try to correct for past injustices – as well as to 
promote diversity as the policy has been used today, this paper agues that affirmative 
action must change to an economic approach that targets class-based remedies in favor of 
race-based ones. The obvious follow-up question is whether a class-based remedy could 
be argued unconstitutional as race-based policies have, and I posit that it could not. 
 Deciding whether a class-based affirmative action system could be ruled 
unconstitutional is a difficult task on its face because, as Goldsmith points out in his 
vision of a class-based affirmative action policy, “no court has examined a challenge to 
class-based affirmative action plans,” despite the introduction of these policies in a few 
bold universities.89 When the Supreme Court delves into matters concerning the 14th 
Amendment’s equal protection clause, they use different levels of ‘scrutiny’ to determine 
whether or not a law or policy is or is not constitutional. This practice was famously 
created in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., a case which changed 	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  as	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  UCLA	  school	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  law,	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  Neil	  Goldsmith,	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the traditional view of the Court regarding congressional actions, relaxing their rules 
guiding the constitutionality of (at first) commercial activity.90 This change in precedent 
over time led to the creation of three levels of judicial ‘scrutiny,’ based on what the law 
in question was concerning. ‘Strict scrutiny,’ outlined in the Carolene Products case, is 
the most difficult level to pass. If the Court uses this level of scrutiny, then a law must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest, be implemented in a narrowly tailored 
way to achieve that goal without being overly broad it its effect, and finally must use the 
least restrictive means of achieving the government’s interest that can be used. Strict 
scrutiny is automatically triggered when a ‘suspect class’ in involved, which today apply 
to any case involving policies surrounding race, national origin, and alienage.91 
Intermediate scrutiny, the middle option, is similar to strict scrutiny except it requires a 
law to further a governmental interest in a way that is substantially related to that 
interest, and not necessarily in the most restrictive way.92 Intermediate scrutiny grew to 
typically be triggered by policies regarding equal protection93, discrimination, and 
illegitimacy,94 most commonly used in cases looking at sex-based classifications and 
regulations on speech when it impacts a particular message.95 Lastly, the ‘rational-basis 
test,’ as the least stringent of the three levels of scrutiny, applies to all other cases as the 
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  United	  States	  v.	  Carolene	  Products	  Co.	  304	  U.S.	  144.	  Footnote	  4.	  (1938)	  
91	  Race-­‐based	  policies	  enjoyed	  a	  brief	  stint	  of	  being	  subjected	  to	  intermediate	  scrutiny	  following	  Metro	  Broadcasting,	  Inc.	  v.	  FCC.	  497	  U.S.	  547	  (1990)	  before	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  overruled	  a	  short	  time	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  Adarand	  Constructors	  v.	  Pena,	  515	  U.S.	  200	  (1995).	  
92	  Wengler	  v.	  Druggist	  Mutual	  Ins.	  Co.,	  446	  U.S.	  142	  (1980).	  
93	  Unless	  it	  involves	  race,	  in	  which	  it	  triggers	  strict	  scrutiny.	  
94	  See	  Caban	  v.	  Mohammed,	  441	  U.S.	  380	  (1979)	  
95	  Specifically,	  cases	  involving	  speech	  look	  at	  the	  time,	  matter,	  and	  place	  of	  the	  speech	  that	  is	  being	  regulated,	  as	  outlined	  in	  Ward	  v.	  Rock	  Against	  Racism,	  491	  U.S.	  781	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default review test when looking at cases involving the 5th and 14th Amendments to the 
Constitution. The rational-basis test only needs a legitimate governmental reason for a 
law or policy, and often it does not even need the explicit outlining of what that reason is 
by the legislature, executive, or agency involved in passing that policy.96  
As affirmative action policies are generally argued under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th amendment,97 the merits of affirmative action (and any de jure shift in 
policy whatsoever) would seem to hinge on what level of scrutiny the court applies to the 
case, however I argue that a class-based affirmative action policy could satisfy both the 
intermediate and strict scrutiny doctrines outlined above. 
 There is a slight chance that, if the class-based affirmative action system were to 
reach the Supreme Court, the justices would use the rational basis review due to the fact 
that socioeconomic distinctions under the law have yet to be held inherently suspicious in 
the courts interpretation of the 14th amendment. Justice Powell’s majority opinion in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez found that “wealth discrimination in 
the school financing context does not invoke strict scrutiny, but rather, rational basis 
review.98 However, this justification is thin and will likely be tossed out in favor of a 
higher level of scrutiny if inevitably brought to the court under a challenge through the 
Equal Protection Clause. In Washington v. Davis, the Court held that government actions 
must be both discriminatory in purpose and impact to be seen as unconstitutional, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  While	  officially	  being	  introduced	  in	  modern	  terms	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  Carolene	  
Products	  Co.,	  the	  test’s	  origins	  lie	  in	  McCulloch	  v.	  Maryland,	  17	  U.S.	  316	  (1819).	  
97	  See	  previous	  chapter	  on	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  current	  form	  of	  race-­‐based	  affirmative	  action	  
98	  Genevieve	  Campbell.	  Is	  Classism	  the	  New	  Racism?	  Avoiding	  Strict	  Scrutiny’s	  Fatal	  in	  
Fact	  Consequences	  By	  Diversifying	  Student	  Bodies	  on	  the	  Basis	  of	  Socioeconomic	  
Status.	  34	  N.	  Ky.	  L.	  Rev.	  679.	  2007.	  p.	  7.	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precedent of inherent skepticism that has generally triggered intermediate or strict 
scrutiny when brought to the Court’s attention.99 Even though a class-based affirmative 
action policy would appear neutral on its face, the implementation and the underlying 
reasons for the policy would almost undoubtedly trigger a higher level of scrutiny. As 
proof, Justice White’s majority opinion in Washington v. Davis continues that “the 
central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race,” going on to say in a 
disclaimer that official acts are not held inherently unconstitutional because they have a 
“racially disproportionate impact,” but they are held under a closer lens to try and find 
any “invidious quality” or “discriminatory purpose.”100 So, even though class-based 
affirmative action viewed in a political vacuum would not appear racially discriminatory, 
the shift in a typically race-based law would inevitably be for the “discriminatory 
purpose” that Justice White and the Court is skeptical of, and therefore would trigger a 
higher form of scrutiny than the simple rational-basis review. 
 This precedent creates a difficult problem for advocates of class-based affirmative 
action to mitigate, as the obvious intention of the policy is to try and help disadvantaged 
minorities through race-neutral means, which could be seen as a guise and subsequently 
struck down. However, precedent exists in both constitutional law and economic theory 
that can bolster the class-based argument. In Palmer v. Thompson, argued two years prior 
to Washington, Justice White wrote in a concurring opinion that “the operative effect of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Washington	  v.	  Davis,	  411	  U.S.	  1	  (1973).	  
100	  Id.	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the law, rather than its discriminatory purpose, is the paramount factor.”101 In the Court’s 
majority opinion as well, Justice Black held that no discrimination occurred due to the 
relevant law in the case not using “invidious racial motivations” and the law was applied 
“equally to both its white and African American citizens.”102 The Palmer case was about 
the forced segregation of public pools in heavy African-American populated areas in 
Jacksonville, Mississippi, which the city claimed could not be integrated due to economic 
concerns and shut them down, keeping pools in predominantly white areas untouched. If 
the ‘incidental effect’ on race of a policy that is as blatant as forced segregation of public 
pools is not held to a higher level of scrutiny, then it becomes dubious to assume that a 
policy that could be taken advantage of by all races – as a class-based affirmative action 
policy would – would then be held to a higher judicial standard. More recently and more 
relevantly to the way affirmative action policy is discussed today, Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District came down from the Court as a rare 4-1-4 
split decision, holding that while race could not be used as the sole determining factor for 
assigning students to specific schools, race could be used as one metric to achieve the 
diverse environment that the Seattle School District was looking for.103 In the foregoing 
case, Chief Justice Roberts famously said in his plurality opinion that “the way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,” a 
sentiment joined fully by three other justices on the court, with four generally weighing 
the constitutional benefits of re-segregation more important than concerns of equal 	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  Justice	  White.	  Concurring	  opinion	  in	  Palmer	  v.	  Thompson.	  403	  U.S.	  217	  (1971).	  	  
102	  Id.	  Justice	  Black,	  majority	  opinion.	  
103	  The	  Court	  rejected	  the	  ‘racial	  isolation’	  argument	  as	  a	  legitimate	  reason	  to	  reapportion	  students	  based	  on	  race	  to	  specific	  schools.	  Parents	  Involved	  in	  
Community	  Schools	  v.	  Seattle	  School	  District	  No.	  1.	  551	  U.S.	  701	  (2007)	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protection.104 The official opinion of the court included a piece that found that diversity 
for educational purposes is enough to serve a compelling state interest, and that it could 
pass the strict scrutiny analysis that was used to rule in the case.105 The Chief Justice 
continues in this opinion to say that “the interest in diversity in higher education” is a 
compelling state interest that passes the strict scrutiny test, coupled with the “remedying 
[of] the effect of past intentional discrimination” as the two compelling state interests for 
the use of racial classifications.106 I argue that class-based affirmative action fits both of 
these two interest more effectively and (more importantly) in a more narrowly tailored 
way than the current system does by remedying the past effects of state-sponsored 
discrimination quicker, with a greater emphasis on and interest in diversity in higher 
education than we have currently. I will get into the logistics of this policy in the next 
chapter. 
As stated above, the Court will likely be inherently skeptical of any case 
regarding affirmative action policy, triggering some form of higher scrutiny. However, 
looking at class-based affirmative action policies in isolation, they do not explicitly 
trigger these higher levels of scrutiny. The current precedent of the Court outlines the 
necessity of higher levels of scrutiny to combat “prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities,”107 which have applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to cases regarding 
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  The	  9th	  justice,	  Justice	  Kennedy,	  is	  somewhat	  in	  between	  these	  two	  points,	  and	  is	  the	  single	  split	  vote	  on	  this	  case	  that	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  to	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  the	  dichotomous	  viewpoints.	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  See	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts	  plurality	  opinion	  in	  Part	  III-­‐A.	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  Id.	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  United	  States	  v.	  Carolene	  Products	  Co.	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sex,108 and strict scrutiny to ‘suspect classifications’ of citizens.109 Nowhere in these 
higher levels of scrutiny is socio-economic status ever mentioned. However, in their 
interpretation of Grutter, the court said that “diversity constitutes a compelling interest 
under the first prong”110 of strict scrutiny interpretation, which could be applied to a 
class-based affirmative action plan; because  
“Just as a Hispanic student seemingly brings different views and experiences to a 
classroom predominantly filled with white students, a student from a lower 
socioeconomic class similarly brings different view to a classroom filled with 
white students.”111 
 
However, this chapter has outlined that the lens through which the Court views any 
challenge to class-based affirmative action cases is essentially irrelevant, as a properly-
constructed plan would satisfy any level of review. While the racial gap in the United 
States has seen improvement in the decades since affirmative action’s inception (despite 
becoming recently stagnant), the socio-economic gap has widened.112 The ultimate 
question is then how to continue to decrease the racial gap with race-blind policy, while 
simultaneously hindering or decreasing the spread of economic disparity. If a class-based 
system will pass constitutional scrutiny in the face of any challenge, then the obvious 
follow-up question is: Will class-based shifts in affirmative action policy would be more 
effective than the system we have in place currently? The next chapter takes up this issue 	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  Intermediate	  scrutiny	  restricts	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  sex	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  Journal	  of	  Law	  &	  Policy	  313.	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  G.	  William	  Domhoff.	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  University	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  California	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  Santa	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  February	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and delves into the logistics of the policy factors that surround the effective 
implementation of a class-based system. 
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Chapter 5: Data-Driven Change 
 
Part I: The Broken System 
 
By devoting the previous two chapters to the constitutionality of affirmative 
action I have begged an important question – does affirmative action really work? As the 
introduction alluded to, over the last decade or so the data seems to show that it has not 
worked in the way it was originally intended. While the policy has continued to bring 
racial diversity to college campuses and corporations alike, this paper makes the 
argument that the way the program is currently run veils the real systemic racial and 
socioeconomic problems that it was originally intended to remedy. This failure of the 
affirmative action system is the result of dual constriction of the policy’s scope as well as 
the ever-increasing competitiveness of our education and employment systems, realities 
that will help us grapple with possible solutions to the issue. Part I of this chapter is 
devoted to the identification of these problems by looking at a myriad of studies and 
linking their findings together to create a narrative, while Part II looks at the University 
of California system as a case study for reform, as the UC schools unilaterally did away 
with explicit racial preferences in the late 1990s and the data on the reform’s 
effectiveness has just recently been analyzed. Juxtaposing the two parts, Part III will offer 
comprehensive reforms based on these studies. 
To draw out the technical problems of affirmative action, one can begin by using 
a remedy drawn meticulously from the issues’ root causes. Attempting to link these 
technical issues together will give society a greater understanding of the crux of the 
problem with modern day affirmative action, and provide insight into the necessary scope 
of the solution. First and foremost, the data on affirmative action in higher education 
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shows that there is a great discrepancy between the educational intentions of Black 
students entering college and their graduating-selves years later. Black students are 
entering colleges and universities more frequently then their academically-similar White 
peers. Controlling for academic preparation (i.e. comparing similarly prepared students), 
“Black high school graduates are about 30% more likely than comparable Whites to 
attend a 4-year college.”113 Furthermore, “Black [students] are more likely to achieve 
STEM bachelors degrees” than their White peers.114 Again controlling for academic 
preparation, 43% of Black students achieve a STEM degree compared to 33% of White 
students in the top 16% of student academic preparation scores, and 23% to 16% 
respectively in the next 16% of students. However the story of Black student’s 
experiences in college is a dichotomous tale. Despite the incoming figures, overall only 
“22.6% of Black students earned STEM degrees to Whites’ 23.1%”115 and only 16.3% of 
native-born Black students achieved a four-year college education.116 Overall, the figures 
draw out the raw effect of the mismatch theory: on average around 54% of Black male 
students drop STEM degrees, (compared to 6% of White male students).117 More 
shocking is the fact that only 5% of black students who receive preferences end up 
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majoring in engineering, compared to 43% that do not receive substantial preferences.118 
The data shows a simple trend – Black students are not graduating with STEM degrees at 
nearly the same rate as they intend to upon matriculation into colleges and universities. 
Overall, Black students are more likely to go to college and are more interested in 
achieving STEM degrees than their White peers (and do so in the upper academic 
echelons), but in reality the graduation and STEM degree rates do not remotely reflect 
those pre-matriculation interests. Even if the argument could be made that those students 
most affected by mismatch are receiving invaluable education that will pay off in the long 
run, the sort of education they are receiving is not what they are necessarily passionate 
about, interested in, or have very successful careers with after being forced out of the 
major due to academic mismatch. 
These examples highlight two of the most notable differences in the incoming 
versus outgoing data, but they are not unique cases. Further studies that looked into this 
question of race disparity came across an illuminating example – the primary reason for 
the discrepancy was not about race at all. Interestingly, the largest producers of STEM 
degrees among Black students are Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
(HBCUs). In fact, “among the top twenty-one college producers of future Blacks with 
science doctorates, seventeen were HBCUs and none were Ivies,” (emphasis added) 
despite the supposedly much higher caliber of student attending Ivy League schools 
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compared to HBCUs.119 At the same time, studies showed that less academically 
prepared students avoided STEM degrees. So what was the cause? In a narrowly tailored 
study, Smyth and McArdle found that “the greater the disparity between a student’s 
classmates and an individual, the less likely they are of getting a STEM degree,” 
regardless of that students absolute academic caliber.120 Even before looking at racial 
preferences in isolation, a narrative begins to form. The data shows that students who are 
pushed into an academic atmosphere they are not prepared for are significantly less likely 
to get a STEM degree than their peers, and it also shows that Black students outside of 
the top 16% of the general academic performance index rarely graduate with STEM 
degrees, despite apparently desiring to do so when they enter college or university. This 
finding is interesting, but hardly enough to bring an indictment against affirmative action 
as a policy. 
Digging deeper into the relativity aspect of educational success, a comprehensive 
data set from the American Bar Association – who runs the Bar exam who’s passage is a 
precursor to practice law – was analyzed. An initial regression of the data showed that 
“Blacks were much less likely to pass the Bar exam than were Whites with the same 
academic index coming out of college.”121 But, while this surface level analysis was 
necessary to illuminate the problem, a second regression highlighted the problem more 
concretely. Adding class ranking into the equation, the second regression showed that 
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“relative performance in law school was the single-best predictor of Bar [passage] 
results…and more importantly, in this second regression the “race” effect disappeared 
altogether.”122 Controlling for class rank within law schools, there was no difference in 
Bar passage rates across Black and White students. Despite some claims that less Black 
students were passing the Bar exam because of some inherent bias problems within the 
test itself, the second regression highlights a much bolder claim – that it is not the test, 
but the educational institutions themselves that are contributing to the continued 
marginalization of Black students by propagating admissions practices that propagate 
mismatch. 
A third analysis of this data set that controlled not only for college grades and 
class ranking, as mentioned above, but for the quality of the student’s undergraduate 
college or university attended, reaffirmed the findings. Sander estimated that unequal law 
school preferences that create academic mismatch between students upon their 
matriculation “explain at least 80% of the low grades Blacks received.”123 To take away 
the race element completely, Sander studied to see if the same effect held firm when 
substituting older White students, who also generally receive admissions preferences in 
law school, for Black students and found that: 
“When…controlled for mismatch, a large percentage of older White students 
were attending schools with credentials a good deal lower than their 
classmates…had disproportionate trouble on the bar…and [again], 
when…controlling for mismatch, the difference disappeared.”124 
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If true, then the problem becomes much more complex than simply trying to weed out 
any biases in standardized testing. The hypothesis in the law school data essentially says 
that any way you want to turn the data, it clearly shows that one of the greatest 
hindrances of affirmative action effectiveness is, ironically, that students get too much 
help and are therefore underprepared and often underperform. A careful study by Duke 
University looked at admissions preferences blindly in all categories, and found no race 
effect whatsoever, but did find an inverse correlation of admission preferences to 
academic performance.125 If these students are getting preferential treatment to promote 
diversity, they are certainly not feeling its beneficial effects while at school. The 
foregoing studies show that conversations about race in admissions processes are begging 
the question of pre-matriculation performance, and that a small tweak to the scale of 
these preferences could alter the national effectiveness of affirmative action policy. 
Especially in high-skilled degrees such as STEM degrees, law degrees, and medical 
degrees, the knowledge necessary to succeed builds upon itself with each passing class 
and semester. If a student is thrown into that competitive climate without proper 
instruction, they are being set up for failure, which is exactly what Sander and others are 
finding. 
 Countering Sander’s bold claim, Rothstein and Yoon (professors at Princeton and 
Northwestern Universities respectively) dispute the importance of the discovery. They 
break down the mismatch argument and make the claim that if it were true, and relative 
academic performance were as strong and important of an indicator of collegiate success 
as the proponents of the theory suggest, then Black students who attend a slightly (or 	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significantly) less rigorous institution should do better than their peers who went to more 
rigorous ones with the help of affirmative action. The two professor’s contend that a 
closer analysis of the same Bar-passage data shows that, when controlling for within-race 
distributions, Bar-passage rates for Blacks would only be a mere 4 percent lower if they 
attended a more selective school than a less selective one. Similarly, “…the 
corresponding figure [for Whites] is [only] 1.1 percent higher.”126 If the numbers were 
indeed this insignificant, then the mismatch hypothesis would be severely overstated. 
While the data would still show a slight gap in performance, it would be insignificantly 
different from zero. Therefore, Rothstein and Yoon conclude unequivocally that any 
difference in the raw gap in bar passage rates among Black students could be attributed to 
their personal credentials directly correlated to these passage rates, unrelated to any 
mismatch relating to the caliber of schools they attended as a result of affirmative action. 
 However, a closer look at the actual breakdown of the bar passage data showed 
that Rothstein and Yoon’s analysis was not as uniformly correct as they posit. While true 
that “in the upper four fifths of the distribution, Black students perform about as well as 
White students…and sometimes outperform them,”127 this was not true across the entire 
academic spectrum. And while approximately “three quarters of Black law students are in 
the bottom quintile,”128 it is important to note these differences where their effects are 
greatest. In these lower quintiles (as Sander splits them), Black students admitted to elite 
schools based on large preferences were failing the bar exam more than twice as 
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frequently as similarly credentialed students who got the same preferences but chose to 
go to a less elite school.129 Rothstein and Yoon applied their study generally, while 
Sander points out that to understand the true cost of affirmative action, you have to look 
at those it ‘helps’ the most. Black students in the upper levels of academic preparation do 
no need as much (if any) preferences granted to them in order to succeed at a top tier 
school, whereas the largest preferences are granted by mid-tier colleges to less 
academically prepared individuals. If these students are then pushed into elite 
universities, they face extraordinary academic difficulty and have a much rougher time 
entering the legal field than their peers. 
  A quandary that the law school at George Mason University faced drew out more 
details to this effect. Accused of dismissing diversity’s importance by the American Bar 
Association (ABA), the body mandated that they change their admissions policy to 
reflect a greater emphasis on diversity or else face possible denial in their re-accreditation 
as a law school (as they are a relatively new school, established in the 1980s). The Dean 
responded to the ABA by pointing to its own official rulebook. He said that while George 
Mason uses diversity as a soft metric for admittance, they weigh it against the ABA’s 
other accreditation criterion – called Standard 501 – which says, “A law school shall not 
admit applicants who do not appear capable of satisfactorily completing its education 
program and being admitted to the bar.”130 Deciding which standard to weigh more 
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heavily, George Mason University law school looked at their student’s data and found 
that: 
“…our analysis of student performance over the past five years has demonstrated that 
numerical qualifications do place some boundaries around our discretion [related to 
affirmative action policies]. Students with LSAT scores below 150 are more than six 
times as likely to experience academic difficulty…more than thirteen times as likely to be 
dismissed for academic cause, and almost twice as likely to fail the bar exam on their first 
attempt.”131 
 
George Mason University was caught between a rock and a hard place. They were being 
pushed to accept and use admissions preference principles that were more far-reaching 
than they were comfortable with using and risk devaluing the caliber of their student 
body and reputation as a strong law school, or keep their admissions practices and be 
faced with defamation as a racially biased institution and face possible disestablishment 
as a law school entirely. Eventually, with a new Dean and an accreditation process taking 
half a decade, the law school at George Mason University accepted commonly practiced 
affirmative action policies and received their re-accreditation, continuing in perpetuity 
the flaws of affirmative action policy in higher education.132 
 The obvious question to ask the proponents of the mismatch doctrine is whether 
the academic preparedness due to admissions preferences that create dichotomous 
entrance standards based on race have any post-graduation effects on an individual’s 
career prospects. If one of the main goals of our education system is to prepare students 
for the rigor and quality of the professional life, then the entire conversation about the 
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effectiveness of admissions preferences would be overshadowed by evidence 
contradicting the mismatch hypothesis. In short – if these students can still achieve 
promising careers out of college in the face of all of these deleterious hindrances, then the 
mismatch discussion is rather pointless. While reforms would certainly help 
underrepresented minority students gain social and economic mobility faster, the problem 
would not be a very pressing one if these students left these overwhelming academic 
atmospheres to work good jobs post-graduation. Speaking to this point directly in one of 
the most famous books about affirmative action ever written, Bowen and Bok (presidents 
of Princeton and Harvard respectively) gathered data on tens of thousands of students in 
three college settings: in super-elite colleges, ‘good’ state schools, and HBCUs.133 The 
study found that racial preferences increased the college graduation rates of Black 
students, which they measured by dividing colleges into three tiers of selectivity and 
“showing that, other things being equal, Blacks were more like to graduate if they 
attended the top tier of colleges.”134 However, critics took issue with that statements for 
several reasons, the simplest being that everyone has a higher graduation rate at top tier 
colleges as it is a more primary concern for top tier schools than lower tier ones.  
The more complex and convincing argument against The Shape of the River has 
to do with the implementation of mismatch in educational intuitions. In his study of 
America’s colleges and universities, Sander found a ‘cascade effect’ of racial 
preferences. In short, “racial preferences are smaller at super-elite college than they are at 
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very elite colleges, and are smaller at very elite colleges than they are at ‘regular’ elite 
colleges,” and so on and so forth.135 It is called a ‘cascading effect’ in part because the 
use of racial preferences at these institutions set a standard that less elite schools follow, 
which pushed to use even larger preferences, greatly expanding the general size and 
scope of the mismatch problem. Furthermore, there is some evidence that race based 
admissions preferences has a negative effect on future earnings and income levels. While 
a degree from a name-brand school like Harvard or Yale is a distinction that a graduate 
carries with them for life and can open occupational doors in a way that few other 
degrees can, the evidence that degrees from these institutions are inherently better for 
one’s career is surprisingly weak, especially for those that receive admissions 
preferences. In an analysis of the data in The Shape of the River, Sander found that 
“ending up in the bottom 1/3rd of one’s class (as do most students who receive large 
preferences[, as discussed earlier]) has a large, negative effect on long-term earnings.”136 
An interesting study by Dale and Krueger137 took the same foregoing data and analyzed 
college choices of students and compared them to their present employment situations. 
They took students who had been accepted into “similar or identical pairs” of colleges, 
with one going to the more elite college than the other. Fifteen years later, they analyzed 
their earnings and found, surprisingly for proponents of the current form of affirmative 
action, students that attended the less prestigious institution earned either “as much and 
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perhaps more than did similar students attending more-elite schools.” 138 Similarly, a 
post-graduation study by the University of Michigan law school on its graduates from 
1972 to 1985 found that students with high grades that got into law firms were 7 to 8 
times more likely to stay and become partners compared to those with low GPAs – 
regardless of the caliber of the law school.139 This educational data is nothing 
revolutionary, but it shows how diminished the race effect is compared to the 
preparedness and academic performance of the student, further proving the weakness of 
our affirmative action system. The Dale and Krueger study of the data in The Shape of 
the River, coupled with the Sander and Yakowitz study using the same data, outlines how 
the claims of racial preferences leading to better graduation rates, and therefore better 
employment opportunities, are flawed. At best, the foregoing authors contest, the data is 
stretched and manipulated to frame the debate in the best way possible for the proponents 
of affirmative action with confirmation bias, rather than letting the data drive the results. 
Recently, Rothstein and Yoon140 again contested the findings of the proponents of 
the mismatch hypothesis, arguing in favor of the impact of elite college attendance on 
future career prospects and tried to reaffirm at least some of the claims in The Shape of 
the River. They found “zero evidence of mismatch effects on employment outcomes,”141 
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finding instead that Black students were much more likely than similarly qualified White 
student to obtain good jobs.142 The researchers say that this so-called “reverse 
mismatch”143 means that Black students do not have to achieve great academic success to 
be employed to a ‘good’ firm. Their point is purely to counter Sanders, and they do not 
go so far to say that affirmative action in law schools necessarily helps Black students, 
but they find no evidence of the supposed negative effects. However, their argument rests 
on the core claim “Black underperformance appears primarily in the bottom quintile of 
the entering credentials distribution,”144 with small diversity among Black and White 
students in the upper four quintiles. Ironically, this argument essentially proves the 
mismatch hypothesis. The Black students employed at big firms are typically those in the 
upper four quintiles (often by requirement) and do not have the same academic mismatch 
that Black students in the lowest quintile do in their respective law school, overwhelming 
made up of students not needing admissions preferences to succeed. By recognizing that 
these ‘reverse mismatch’ preferences completely overlook the large swath of Black 
students concentrated in the lowest quintile due to academic mismatch from race-based 
preferences, Rothstein and Yoon prove the great depth of the mismatch problem and the 
extraordinary inefficiency of our current system. While the original goal of affirmative 
action regarding education policy was to propel disadvantaged Black students to career 
heights that would be immensely difficult to reach without institutional help, in effect our 
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policies are doing the opposite – putting these students in through academically rigorous 
institutions with very few job prospects upon graduation. 
 The data, case studies, and examples draw out the core problem with affirmative 
action policy as it being affected today. Ironically, Black and Hispanic students are often 
being offered far too much assistance in admissions practices in higher education, the last 
real bastion of affirmative action policy. Regardless of your stance on affirmative action 
policy generally, the thesis that there is a drastic mismatch between the goals of the 
policy and its effects is a disconcerting one. Moreover, this effect is not unique to the 
American education system. The ‘mismatch’ effect was seen in an unrelated test by the 
World Bank to try and develop an efficient means of childhood education in countries 
that desperately needed help: 
“Several years ago the World Bank helped to fund an experiment in Kenya in which 
thousands of elementary school children were randomly assigned to two types of classes: 
one that grouped students with a broad range of academic skills together, and one that 
separated them into high-preparation and low-preparation halves. Three distinguished 
American economists participated in the experiment’s design, observed its outcomes, and 
concluded that the “tracked” students (in both the higher and lower classes) learned more 
– suggesting that teachers taught more effectively when they calibrated their teaching to a 
narrower range of student preparation.”145 
 
The independent World Bank study confirms the mismatch hypothesis and adds 
to its credibility, showing how the mismatch effect plays out in the classroom. Because 
the study was performed essentially for internal use, it is untainted with the bias so 
readily ascribed to the policies’ detractors in the affirmative action discussion. The 
question then becomes one of ‘why?’ Why fight for a losing cause, both in its 	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constitutional merits and in the effects of its policy? Aside from the core mismatch issue 
described in the foregoing chapter, there are several other outstanding issues with the 
policy that are being overlooked. 
As described in the introduction, being Black does not necessarily equate to being 
African-American, nor do either Black or African-American equate to having been 
disenfranchised in ones heritage. In fact, nearly 40% of Black students who are Ivy 
League undergraduates are first or second generation immigrants,146 completely outside 
of the purview of the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action policy, but receiving its 
benefits all the same. This statistic is only forecasted to become more confusing with 
time. The immigrant Black population constitutes fully 20% of the current Black 
population in the United States, and tends to be highly educated due to our strict domestic 
immigration laws. Furthermore, the multiracial population grew by 36% from 2000-2009 
and is projected to grow another 21% by 2015. Classifying which races to include in 
affirmative action policies gets more difficult when you factor in these multiracial 
populations who have some tangential heritage to disenfranchised groups, especially 
when trying to include Hispanics, Southeast Asians, or American Indians, all of whom 
have higher cross-racial marriage rates than Blacks.147 As a society, if we are to push for 
racial diversity, the line at which ‘diversity’ begins and ends is not so clear. So far, 
biracial individuals have taken advantage of affirmative action policies, but what about 
multiracial students who may be 25% or 10% Black, Hispanic, or Native American? A 
recently-elected U.S. Senator in Massachusetts, Elizabeth Warren, was put in the national 
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spotlight for taking advantage of these affirmative action programs by possibly checking 
the box marked ‘Native American,’ on college and job applications, having 1/32nd of her 
heritage tied to the Cherokee people, despite not appearing Native American at all.148 Is 
affirmative action simply about what race someone appears? The social line seems 
difficult to find, and it is only going to become harder with time. 
As affirmative action policies reach a decreasing amount of impoverished and 
disadvantages Black students, its effects become increasingly meaningless. Furthermore, 
with the growth of our population and increase in economic disparity, countervailing 
forces make effective affirmative action policies more necessary than ever. Briggs, an 
editor for the Brooking Institution, published a book outlining the dangers of our singular 
growth pattern, pointing out that “compared with their counterparts in European and 
other wealthy regions, America’s metropolitan areas are both very sprawling and very 
segregated by race and class,”149 an effect that gets compounded with the fact that “low 
income Blacks tend to be substantially worse off than Whites with similar 
incomes…[and] tend to live in highly segregated neighborhoods [more so than their 
White counterparts].”150  
In fact, this phenomenon is so widely accepted that it has been a term has been 
coined for the experiences of various racial and class groups in different “geographies of 
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opportunity.”151 Up through 1972, “more than half of Blacks entering elite colleges came 
from families in the bottom half of the socio-economic distribution.152 Just thirty years 
later the story was completely flipped - by 1992, “the proportion was down to 8%, [and] 
two thirds of the 1992 cohort of Black students at elite colleges came from the top 
quartile of the American socioeconomic distribution.”153 For poor Black Americans, 
segregation has moved from forced government action to the invisible hand of market 
forces and private segregation by race. While this type of segregation may not be as 
explicit or deleterious as government sponsored segregation of public and private 
enterprises, the cyclical nature of poverty and segregation is still ever present in Black 
America. With affirmative action policies that fail to reach their intended beneficiaries, 
poor Black students have very little hope of escaping this cycle. Current measurements of 
social mobility show that “persons who start life in the bottom 1/5th of the income 
distribution are less likely now than they were a generation ago to ‘move up’ to the top 
half, [regardless of race],”154 largely due to the fact that high school seniors “in the 
bottom 1/5th of the socio-economic distribution are 70% less likely to attend a four-year 
college than academically similar seniors in the top 1/5th of the socio-economic 
distribution,” also regardless of race.155  Forgetting about race for a moment, the trend in 
our society and education system is that our elite colleges are split alarmingly along 
income lines. Today, “roughly three-quarters of students at elite colleges are from 	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families in the top quarter of the socio-economic distribution, whereas only 3% come 
from the bottom quarter and fewer than 10% come from the bottom half.”156 Though 
social mobility has dramatically increased for the relatively well off in society, it has 
become increasingly stagnant for the poor. Black students are left to combat both racial 
isolation, which is inversely correlated to wealth, and with the (far more daunting) 
economic isolation and disadvantage that has steadily reduced their odds at success for 
decades. As of 2011, Black youth are three times as likely to be poor than White youth 
(and more than three times as likely to live in poverty), 157 the largest percentage poor 
Black youth are under the age of five,158 and as a group Black youth have a 40% change 
of being born poor (compared to 8% of their White peers).159 The racial and economic 
disadvantage faced by Black children born in the United States today has created an 
increasingly destitute subgroup of society that affirmative action is effectively missing, 
exacerbating the dismal outlook that the youth face. With the odds stacked against poor 
Black student’s success in an extreme way, reforming affirmative action policy to is more 
critical than ever to fulfill the promise of our grandfathers.160 
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Part II: California Proposition 209 – A Case Study 
 In the mid-1990s the debate about racial preferences, especially when used in 
higher education, became the spotlight of national discussion. The domestic conversation 
had not yet discovered to the mismatch hypothesis, but instead was focused on the 
declining effectiveness of affirmative action, the apparent racial tension that the program 
created, and the disadvantage that affirmative action created opposite of those it helped, 
namely to Whites and Asians. In 1995 the Board of Regents of the University of 
California (UC), who oversaw nine UC campuses across the state, voted to unilaterally 
end racial and gender preferences in their admissions processes. The new proposition, 
called SP-1, read that the state shall bar admissions policies that “use race, religion, sex, 
color, ethnicity, or national origin as a criterion for admission to the university or 
program of study.”161 Soon after in 1996, the citizens of California that extended those 
prohibitions in the form of Proposition 209 to all state programs, passing overwhelmingly 
in the November election.162 Without getting too entrenched in the details of the 
immediate aftermath of SP-1 and Prop. 209, suffice it to say that the backlash against the 
policy was overwhelming, and the debate about racial preferences raged on a national 
level to heights not seen since the 1960s. Scores of protests were held outside the meeting 
places of the UC system’s Board of Regents, regularly drawing crowds of hundreds. High 
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profile Senators such as Lieberman and Kerry clashed with prominent figures like Jesse 
Jackson, and even President Clinton got involved to some degree with his “mend it, don’t 
end it” stance on affirmative action policy that was outlined more concretely during 1995 
and 1996.163 Throughout the vitriolic opposition and impassioned support, the UC Board 
of Regents held firm and the policies have remained in place since their inception. As the 
first major institution to put aside race-based admissions preferences, the UC System 
serves as the paramount case study regarding affirmative action policy, and a thorough 
analysis of the data from the ongoing experiment succinctly illuminates the thread of data 
and observation behind the mismatch hypothesis. Using a comprehensive dataset 
obtained through the University of California Office of the President (UCOP) on a wide 
range of academic metrics from the institution of Prop 209 in 1998 (when it first took 
effect), Duke professors led by Economist Peter Arcidiacono ran several studies. 
Monumentally surprising to some (but not to its proponents) their initial findings were as 
follows: 
 “Using these [UCOP] student-level data, we find evidence that the graduation 
rates of minorities increased after Prop 209 was implemented. Indeed, the data reveal that 
under-represented minorities were 4.4 percentage points more likely to graduate in the 
period after Prop 209 that the period before. We also find that the distribution of 
minorities entering the UC system shifted from its more selective campuses (e.g., UC 
Berkeley and UCLA) towards its less selective ones. Moreover, while there was an 
overall improvement in the academic preparation of minorities enrolling at UC campuses 
after Prop 209 went into effect, the greatest improvements occurred at the less-selective 
campuses. Taken together, this evidence may be consistent with the mismatch 
hypothesis…”164 
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The mismatch hypothesis adds practical weight when combined with an earlier study by 
the same economists that found that “Prop 209 had the effect of raising five-year minority 
graduation rates from 3 to 7 percent” depending on the group165, and that these effects 
only significantly increase when focused on STEM degrees and the time it takes to 
achieve a degree. Sander and Taylor supplemented these findings with more detailed 
evidence. Absolute minority enrollment plummeted at the better UC schools like UCLA 
and Berkley, but interestingly yield rates increased across the schools affected.166 Black 
student applications increased in 7 of the 8 UC campuses affected, and increased in all 
eight for Hispanic students, which in turn was coupled with a nearly all-time record yield 
rate at Berkley167, where critics were saying that the new affirmative action policies had 
failed. Grade Point Averages (GPA) immediately rose as well, as Blacks and Hispanics 
who graduated in four years with a 3.5+ GPA increased by 63% from the implementation 
of Prop 209 through 2003.168 Doctorates and STEM degrees earned by Black and 
Hispanic students combined rose by nearly 50% from 1997 through 2003, whereas the 
number of Blacks and Hispanics majoring in ethic studies and communications – the 
degrees typically pursued after preferred minority students dropped STEM courses – fell 
by 20% during the same period.169 The data put forth by Arcidiacono and Sander 
overwhelmingly found “The elimination of formal racial preference led to increases…in 
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the numbers of Blacks and Hispanics earning bachelor’s degrees…and even more 
dramatic increases in the numbers earning bachelors degrees on time,”170 in areas 
previously unattainable to Black and Hispanic students due to the mismatch concept. The 
number of Black and Hispanic freshman who graduated in four years rose 55% from Prop 
209’s inception through 2003, the average absolute increase of Black students who 
received bachelors degrees was 90 students per year and over 1,100 for Hispanic students 
per year as well.171 There did not seem to be an academic downside to the analysis of the 
UCOP data. 
 Countering the mismatch theory somewhat, Arcidiacono tried to lessen the power 
of his and Sander’s blunt analysis by attributing the dramatic changes to other effects. 
The mitigation of the mismatch construct through the elimination of racial preferences 
did not create graduation rate increases for students at the bottom of the academic 
preparation spectrum, and overall the effects decrease when looking at five-year 
graduation rates rather than four-year rates.172 Also, specific responses by the UC system 
schools themselves may have lessened the effect. In order not to appear to care less about 
their minority students after Prop 209, many universities ramped up their efforts to 
prevent drop-out rates from increasing and offered increase assistance in achieving a 
degree, positing that this mitigation effect explained 34%-50% of the increase in minority 
graduation rates in the years after Prop 209’s inception. This finding was coupled with a 
similar estimation, saying that 30-46% of the minority graduation increase could be 
attributed to programs aimed at minority retention from grade to grade, all the way 	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through graduation, with only 20% of the effect coming from ‘better matching’ of 
students to schools.173 Furthermore, while admissions and yield rates increased generally 
across the UC system, they drastically fell at the highest ranked schools of UCLA and 
Berkley.  
Interestingly, due to other metrics aside from race being used in the UC system’s 
admission policy such as parental income and parental education, the socioeconomic 
diversity of minority enrollees greatly increased, which could be argued is the primary 
intent of affirmative action policy.174 In fact, the advantages gained were not uniform at 
all, and Arcidiacono found that the share of applicants and admits who had educated 
parents with a combined income of over $80,000 fell, showing that although minorities 
from advantaged backgrounds applied at similar rates to similar levels of institutions, 
they were ironically less likely to enroll and less likely to graduate than their less-well-off 
peers.175 Whatever the detractors of Prop 209 may have to say about the program, the fact 
remains that under represented minorities saw a modest increase in their yield rate 
relative to non-under represented minorities after the institution of the proposition, which 
interestingly happens above the (also) modest increase in the general yield rate of all 
students after Prop 209.176  
Prop 209 and the UC system’s experience with the proposition have drawn out the 
evidence of the mismatch hypothesis. The UC system saw a shift in matriculation into the 
universities generally leaning on higher applicant pools for the less academically 	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stringent schools, with a marked decrease in the absolute number of under represented 
minorities across the campuses. However, the decreases were countered by marked 
increases in the matriculation rate out of the universities, higher GPAs, a faster rate and 
higher likelihood of degree achievement, a drastic increase in STEM degrees for Black 
and Hispanic students, and the advancement of socioeconomically disadvantaged 
minorities relative to their more well-off peers, both within their race and outside of it. 
Taking the lessons from Prop 209, as well as including some recent findings based on 
additional data about academic preferences and performance, the solutions to the 
affirmative action ‘problem’ can be proscribed relatively simply. 
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Chapter 6: Proposed Reforms 
Throughout this work, I have outlined the constitutional and political problems 
with affirmative action policy, and drawing attention to those that will simultaneously 
pass constitutional muster as well as serve underrepresented minorities more effectively 
in its implementation. Without doubt, affirmative action policy has to change to survive, 
a reality that even its most staunch defenders must acknowledge. I am proposing what I 
believe will be reforms that will fix our current system as well as create continuous 
feedback loop to further modify the policy as circumstances change over time. Every day 
that floundering policies are allowed to continue is another day that those same policies 
harm the lives that they are supposed to aid. 
Reform I: Change Affirmative Action policies to a Class-Based system - 
catering these preferences in an explicitly Race-Neutral yet implicitly 
Race-Focused way 
The mismatch hypothesis is founded on a simple principle – that affirmative 
action policies regarding admissions preferences would work better if they were less 
extreme. Instead of making them superficially weaker like the Supreme Court does 
through the mandated constriction of abstract definitions (as explained in Chapters 1 & 
3), this reform is referring to the vast aid that underrepresented minority students receive 
upon applying to a college or university. The Court has systematically restricted 
affirmative action’s use except in a very narrow set of cases, especially since Bakke was 
handed down in 1978, over 35 years ago. While it may not particularly be caused by 
these court cases directly, there had been a correlated increase in racial wealth disparity, 
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especially over the last 25 years. Nearly all ethnic groups have made absolute gains 
during this time, yet Black individuals have become relatively much worse off than their 
White counterparts. If you recall, in the previous chapter a significant amount of time was 
spent on the importance of a relative inequality in the education system, which in turn 
creates poor academic performance and restarts the cycle of poverty for the marginalized 
group. In fact, a study by Thomas Shapiro, one of the foremost scholars on racial 
inequality in the United States, found that some of the biggest drivers of the increasing 
racial wealth gap are the lack of either a beneficial college education or any college 
education at all, as well as years of homeownership, household income, unemployment, 
and inheritance.177 The gains of equal achievements of wealth or business strategy have 
also yielded disproportionately more gains for Whites than for Blacks. All of these 
factors have led the income gap to widen from $85,000 in 1984 to over $236,000 in 2009 
– a 277% increase in 25 years, or an average of 11% annually.178  Though showing signs 
of weakness in recent years, a trite (yet core) argument of affirmative action is that it 
helps underrepresented minorities get into good schools, and good schools lead to good 
jobs, and good jobs lead to a better quality of life. Clearly this has not been working for 
the Black community over the last 25 years, as the wealth inequality has increased at a 
staggering rate.  
Antovics and Backes recently released an interesting paper detailing how these 
reforms could be carried out. They looked at Prop 209 and the admission changes that 
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took place across the UC system, as well as how those rules affected the quality of the 
students based on SAT scores, high school GPA, and other predictors of college 
performance.179 They constructed a model to figure out how the UC system changed the 
weight of their admissions practices after Prop 209 (which were not publically released) 
by comparing student data to admissions statistics before and after the change. When they 
came up with a relatively sound model that fairly accurately predicted whether or not a 
student would gain admittance into the various UC system schools, they discovered the 
interesting ways that the UC system was catering their admissions decisions in a race 
neutral way but still managing to admit high levels of underrepresented minorities.180 
Looking at the top four UC schools in isolation, Antovics and Backes saw a decrease 
importance of SAT scores and a relative increase in the importance of GPA and family 
background, leading to a near 7% increase in admission for underrepresented minorities 
by 2004-2006. Similarly, at UCLA underrepresented minorities saw an 11% increase in 
admissions ‘odds’ in the same period through similar tactics.181 While these steps to 
mitigate the decrease in underrepresented minorities attending Berkley and UCLA did 
not cover the near 31% drop after the implementation of Prop 209, the universities were 
still able to make up a significant amount of the loss (about 16-26% depending on the 
campus) with such simple changes, which also have positively affected Asians’ relative 
chances slightly.182 
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The obvious follow-up question is how these admittance changes affect the new 
student body at the various UC campuses. After noting that the changes are not restricted 
to underrepresented minorities, Antonovics and Backes compare the student’s high 
school test scores and GPA to their first-year college GPA. They find a steady increase in 
the quality of the students over time.183 Furthermore, while Antonovics and Backes 
measured the sum of the student body’s change in academic quality, they also estimated 
(based on their admittance equation) that this overall shift was due to the substantial 
changes in the marginal admits, which they are not able to measure with the data they 
have. 184  
The Antovics and Backes study outlines how explicit race-neutral practices could 
be applied in an implicitly race-based way, which would also pass constitutional muster 
as discussed in Chapter 4. The next crucial step in this process of effectively reforming 
affirmative action policy is to determine what metrics should be applied. There are a 
plethora of studies looking at the dismal reality that underrepresented minority youth face 
in our society today, and taking some of those realities and applying them to weigh in on 
educational reforms neutrally can help begin the process of jumpstarting affirmative 
action’s effectiveness. Affirmative action policies should provide academic preference to 
qualified individuals (by the standard of the relevant College or University) to the 
following areas, which only represent a few ideas to kick-start the discussion surrounding 
the most effective race-neutral implicitly race-helping admissions and hiring tactics: 
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1. Focus on geographic areas with low rates of health insurance and/or 
high health risks for young people 
Young people, and men in particular, are more likely to be uninsured than any other 
cognizable group in our country. Almost 40% of Black youth ages 18-29 do not have 
health coverage, which is a smaller percentage than Hispanics, Native Americans, and 
other indigenous peoples (E.g. Native Hawaiians).185 Furthermore, the homicide rate 
among young Black men is three times that of Hispanic men, which is the next highest 
mortality rate. In fact, the number one reason Black youth are killed before reaching the 
age of 29 is intentional homicide, and has been so for over a decade. Homicide and HIV 
death rates combined for Black youth ages 15-24 are over ten times higher than for 
Whites.186 Targeting general areas (by zip code, for example) where these homicide and 
health risks (especially in areas affected highest by HIV if possible) generally will greatly 
help Black youth escape the crushing cycle of poverty and early death in a way that 
current affirmative action policies do not even come close to doing. While these policies 
can be taken advantage of by any race within that area, as Chapter 5 pointed out, the 
more impoverished an area is the more the areas segregates by race, so while Black youth 
only count for 14% of the total United States youth population, the ones most affected by 
poverty and crime are clustered in geographic pockets that represent a far higher number 
than the national average. Catering to this group would seem to reach higher levels of 
low-income individuals to achieve the broader spectrum of diversity discussed near the 
end of Chapter 5, Part I, as over 58,000 households with incomes less than $25,000 go 	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without health insurance. However, this is nearly the exact same number of households 
without health coverage as the income bracket from $50,000 to $75,000, which actually 
contains 200 more households that go without coverage.187 To target individuals with 
health risks even more directly, focus should be put on these youth within metropolitan 
areas, as over 84% of households without health coverage come from these densely 
populated areas188 – which brings me directly to my second point. 
2. Provide Admission Incentives for Metropolitan Youth 
While the focus on education and general high school graduation rates among youth are 
steadily improving unilaterally, urban youth are struggling to keep pace with their 
suburban counterparts. While three out of every ten students fail to get a high school 
diploma, this figure is made more alarming with the recognition that barely half of high 
school students in America’s largest cities graduate high school, accounting for a 
significant portion of the former statistic.189 While cities overall are gradually catching up 
to their suburban peers, the gaps are getting more severe in 10 of America’s largest 25 
cities.190 In our largest 100 cities, Hispanics make up 26% of the population and 22% are 
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Black, compared to just 16.3% and 12.6% of the national averages, respectively.191 
Furthermore, as of the 2010 census, 58 of America’s cities are ‘majority minority,’ up 
from 43 in 2000.192 
 By putting in place admissions programs aimed at talented youth in these areas, 
race-neutral admissions policies would help close the education gap between 
metropolitan and exurban students, particularly aiding the Black and Hispanic 
populations that largely make up these areas. The University of Texas system came up 
with a highly successful way to target these talented yet underrepresented youth (as 
Texas has seven of the nations largest 50 cities193), which was to implement a ‘Top 10%’ 
plan granting automatic admission to any student academically finishing in the Top 10% 
of their high school graduating class. As discussed in the introduction, the program was 
so successful that the case of Fisher v. Texas rests on the presumption that affirmative 
action policies in their current form are not even necessary at all, as this one new 
admissions practice almost completely altered the racial makeup of the UT school 
system. While neutral on its face, incentives like these can help reduce both racial and 
economic divisions in our education system generally. 
As college campuses generally have turned from correcting past governmental 
transgressions to valuing diversity over time, colleges have began to find non-race based 
ways to include vast socioeconomic diversity that still retains a high level of 
underrepresented minorities. As noted in the end of Part I of the previous chapter, classes 	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of citizens have been tending to live together based on socioeconomic status rather than 
race, putting a greater emphasis on diversity of background along those economic rather 
than racial ones. By changing the admittance policies to turn in a way that benefits 
underrepresented groups in a non-racially discriminatory way, the college system 
generally can maintain a higher level of diversity while simultaneously pulling in a more 
intelligent and promising student body. However, without a continuous stream of 
feedback data on these policies as they are put into place, our education system could 
easily slip into the same mistake of propagating outdated and irrelevant metrics, which 
brings me to my second reform  
Reform II: Mandate Open Data Practices by all Government-
Subsidized Colleges and Universities 
Much as the pre-Bakke system of quotas would not be as effective today as they 
were some 35 years ago (pre-1978) due to the increased competitiveness of our schools, 
an increase in wealth gaps among races and people generally, and a myriad of other 
factors, so too will it likely be that policies enacted in 2013 will likely not be as effective 
35 years from now due to similar shifting social and economic trends. Without the Bar 
Passage Study data, the raw admissions statistic given to education academics from the 
University of California system Office of the President, and other data sets from the 
George Mason accreditation issue and post-Prop 209 respectively, the current mismatch 
phenomenon may have gone a long while without being discovered. Regardless of what 
the solutions may be, it is vitally important to continue the constant flow of data to ensure 
that policies are serving their end purpose effectively or even at all.  
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While the best option for public discourse is complete transparency, colleges and 
universities are highly unlikely to release current datasets for fear of criticism, especially 
when it comes to race relations. Therefore, a fair compromise would be to either provide 
a small set of academics or Department of Education officials the access to this data to 
analyze, or to create a panel of the foregoing experts to act independently as advisors to 
the institutions generally. Even if the process were done behind closed doors, it would 
still allow an open dialogue among the higher education system’s officials in a single, 
practical location, rather than being confined to Op-Eds, university press articles, law 
reviews, and other relatively superficial means of effecting long-term change (at least 
compared to de jure changes in admissions policies). The only downfall in the later, less-
transparent approach is that it would give aspiring students less information in the 
application process, which could in turn lead to negative experiences at the institution 
they end up attending due to an information disconnect between what the university 
advertises versus what they do in practice. In Chapter 5, Part I we touched on this 
occurrence with students experiencing the realities of the current affirmative action 
system, and too much opaqueness in the reform system would likely continue this 
problem – yet another mismatch phenomenon. In fact, too much vagueness in any reform 
system could easily lead to ever greater problems with the already-convoluted policy, a 
lesson we have learned since Justice O’Connor’s confusing Grutter opinion, and further 
complications split regionally after Hopwood. As Staton and Vanberg point out in their 
criticism of Grutter, “Supreme Court decisions that set vague standards are particularly 
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likely to be half-heartedly implemented, or even completely ignored, by the government 
actors with relevant operational responsibilities.”194  
Lastly, Sander points to a third key benefit of open data leading to increased 
benefits, which is that the practice “would make far more public the extraordinary lack of 
socioeconomic diversity at nearly all professional schools and elite colleges,” a 
realization that would surely fuel changes in affirmative action policy to become more 
effective in the class-based way the mismatch theory advocates.195 These levels of 
accountability to the public, and to the societal goals that colleges and universities 
advocate (or, at least should advocate) will help keep affirmative action policies relevant 
to the present day, regardless of the time period. Policies like affirmative action are 
intricate and require a very detailed catering to the facts of the era to continue to be 
successful across generations, and the foregoing ideas will allow the policy to remain 
flexible and effective. 
Reform III: Means Test Race-Based Educational Awards 
While race-based awards have generally shown to do little to increase racial 
diversity in college campuses, they can provide invaluable aid to students who could not 
otherwise afford college. The proponents of the mismatch hypothesis argue that colleges 
and universities should outlaw all race-based awards,196 but they can still provide 
personal benefits to many underrepresented minority students who need financial 
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assistance. But that begs the mismatch question regarding class-based remedy’s as being 
more effective than race-based ones: Why not simply give these awards to relatively poor 
students? 
Affirmative action is still a race-based program at its core, and my reforms have 
tried to satisfy both constitutional critics of the policy as well as its proponents. However, 
as there has been no significant legal challenge to race-based awards generally (as private 
actors are allowed to discriminate so long as it does not significantly affect the public 
sphere), I see no reason to stop this practice – just to amend it. 
One point I did not touch on earlier was how students of different income levels 
chose which college or university to attend. Not surprisingly:  
“Compared with similarly qualified students from more affluent families, low-
income students have higher financial threshold requirements for enrolling in 
four-year colleges, especially the more expensive selective colleges. They face 
greater loan burdens and are more debt averse. Financial barriers are even 
growing, as evidenced by the way the value of Pell Grants as a percentage of the 
costs of college attendance has fallen precipitously since the 1970s…Unmet 
financial need—the total price tag minus all student aid—was roughly equivalent 
across income classes in the 1974–75 school year and is still the same for high 
income families but has since doubled for low-income families.”197 
 
At first glance, it makes sense to apply to a State school where tuition and general 
expenses total less than $20,000 a year, versus a highly ranked private school where costs 
can soar well north of $60,000 annually. However, this economic fear is leading highly 
qualified low-income students to apply to lower-tier schools than they are capable of 
excelling in, and coming out with more debt. A recent study conducted jointly between 
Stanford and the University of Virginia found that “low-income students often pay 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197	  Anthony	  P.	  Carnevale	  &	  Stephen	  J.	  Rose.	  “Socioeconomic	  Status,	  Race/Ethnicity	  and	  Selective	  College	  Admissions.”	  The	  Century	  Foundation.	  New	  York,	  New	  York.	  March,	  2003.	  P.	  156-­‐7.	  
C h a s a n 	  |	  83	  	  
significantly more to attend lower-tier schools than selective colleges, which have the 
resources to offer large scholarships.”198  
By reforming affirmative action’s raced-based educational awards system to cater 
to low-income students specifically, the awards can cater to exactly the type of student 
that the policy is trying to help in a highly detailed way. The foregoing study found that 
these students “are admitted, enroll, progress, and graduate at the same rates as high-
income students with equivalent test scores and grades,” and are eager to attend these 
institutions when they are presented with “accurate information about colleges’ net 
costs.”199 Furthermore, these students can go through the tedious and costly admissions 
process with low costs to both them and well as the university (estimated at $6 per 
student) with waivers for application and testing fees.200 By means testing these race-
based awards and advertising them in the relevant communities, our nations best colleges 
and universities can recruit the best and brightest students, who “come from households 
neighborhoods” very similar to other low-income students who do use these methods to 
attend the best educational institutions with very little to no debt upon graduation.  
While changing affirmative action policies to race-neutral, class-based policies 
positively affect the educational and long-term experience of underrepresented minorities 
(as early data from post-Prop 209 showed), I argue that the foregoing three reforms will 
increase that level of effectiveness in the pursuit of affirmative action’s original goals. 
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The specific reforms, open policy practices, and means-testing of race-based awards will 
also allow for the continual reassessment of the program to remain up-to-date with the 
necessity of the times. Diversity-oriented practices outside of affirmative action policies 
can still be used to bring in foreign or immigrant populations to a our higher education 
institutions, and could potentially aid in affirmative action’s original intention of 
correcting for past governmental injustices. However, these diversity-oriented policies 
should complement affirmative action, not overtake its purpose and decrease its 
effectiveness. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
Fisher v. University of Texas brings the affirmative action debate roaring back 
into the national limelight after it had remained relatively dormant since the Michigan 
cases in 2003. The problems and reforms I outline are intended to bring affirmative 
action back to its original intended end – to help minority citizens institutionally 
disadvantaged by governmental policy. Affirmative Action today pursues a vague 
definition of diversity, and applies preferential treatment to the underrepresented minority 
group that each institution is looking for. This diversity is not inherently bad, nor do I 
want to make that claim. Creating an environment that prides diversity of opinion through 
accessing sets of wealthy, immigrant, or foreign minority populations in our higher 
education system fosters many benefits to students, our workplace, and society generally. 
Yet it is when these types of diversity are being justified using affirmative action 
principles that originally were intended to reach the poor, institutionally disadvantaged, 
domestic minority population that these policies become problematic. 
Throughout this work, I have laid out evidence that shows how preferences are at 
the heart of the problems with our affirmative action program. Simply changing to a 
class-based system will not help affirmative action policies become successful without 
either the complete elimination of or drastic cuts in these preferences to the level of 
typical athletic or legacy preferences, which are significantly smaller than racial 
preferences on average.201 The Stanford study cited in the discussion of Reform III in 
Chapter 6 is particularly illuminating, because it shows that with only the simple 
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underrepresented minority youth that I propose colleges and universities target, students 
overwhelmingly align themselves with academically well-matches institutions that also 
typically allow them to graduate with less debt than other options. This finding is crucial 
to keep in mind when reforming affirmative action policies – the reforms are not about 
simply shifting the preferences, but the system altogether. Moving from blanket racial 
preferences for diversity generally to narrowly tailored class-based outreach in specific 
areas can provide the much-needed spark to reignite the efficacy of the program. 
 The economic gap between races is growing. The policies in place, regardless of 
their legislative intent or strong constitutional underpinning, are failing miserably. The 
conversation surrounding race relationships in the United States is a difficult one to face, 
especially when the debate revolves around ways to create or amend legislation that 
directly affects racial groups. Yet these debates have been a part of America’s growth 
since the very drafting of our Constitution, and in turn have (often rather quickly) molded 
and changed the constitution of our society. To avoid the mismatch framework’s 
evidence because the topic is too difficult to broach is a mindset that is, in my opinion, 
diametrically opposed to the history and tradition of our American civic system. Fisher v. 
University of Texas provides a perfect platform to bring this issue to the halls of Congress 
as well as the West Wing, and to extending President Kennedy’s famous rhetoric to this 
discussion; we must tackle these issues “not because they are easy, but because they are 
hard.” 202 
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